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ABSTRACT 
The Combat Control System (CCS) construct developed using a systems 
engineering approach, when implemented, will provide significantly increased levels of 
automation. This high level of automation, will allow a reduction in manpower from 48 
in the current Virginia operational base-line to 23 with four CCS operators per shift and 
an average utilization of 34.1%. This 52% reduction in manpower utilization will provide 
a more rested and effective crew, increasing safety of ship, while potentially saving the 
Navy $41.7 million per year. 
One current thrust for the technical community within the United States Navy 
Submarine Force is how the technical community can sensibly implement Reduced Total 
Ownership Cost (RTOC) ensuring affordability of the next generation Submarine CCS. 
Since the submarine platforms play a significant role in the theater level engagement 
chain, the submarine combat system effectiveness cannot adversely impact the success of 
the overall theater level engagement chain. 
A central theme of our research is to show the effects that lowering combat 
system manning has on the overall effectiveness of the submarine engagement chain. To 
assess the submarine combat system effectiveness, this project evaluates the functional 
data flow through the detect to engage scenarios to evaluate the changes in the level of 
man versus machine and the system parameters to determine the feasibility of replacing 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Combat Control System (CCS) construct developed using a systems 
engineering approach, when implemented, will provide significantly increased levels of 
automation to perform strategic and tactical missions with greater platform Situational 
Awareness (SA), contributing to the success of the overall theater level kill chain. This 
greater level of automation allows for a reduction in manpower from 48 sailors in the 
current Virginia Class operational base-line to 23 sailors, with four CCS operators per 
shift and an average utilization of slightly greater than 34.1%. This 52% reduction in 
manpower utilization will provide a more rested and effective crew, while increasing 
safety of ship and potentially saving the Navy $41.7 million per year. 
One current thrust for the technical community within the United States Navy 
Submarine Force is how the technical community can sensibly implement Reduced Total 
Ownership Cost (RTOC) ensuring affordability of the next generation Submarine CCS. 
One of the important operational cost drivers is manpower, which can be reduced by 
decreasing the number of personnel required to operate the Submarine CCS. However, 
reductions in CCS personnel must be accomplished while maintaining the combat system 
effectiveness. Since the submarine platforms play a significant role in the overall success 
of the theater missions the submarine combat system effectiveness cannot adversely 
impact the overall theater level engagement chain. Due to the nature of the submarine 
missions, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) may not require a target “kill” but may require 
engagement in a role to track for the purposes of monitoring. For this reason the 
submarine engagement chain can perform the tracking or kill depending on the ROE. 
There are many gauges by which to measure Total Ownership Cost (TOC) but the 
single largest driver is the Direct Unit Cost (DUC) associated with manning [GAO, 2003] 
[Allison, 2000]. The current NAVSEA focus in advancing existing individual subsystems 
and low-level tools has not actively considered decreasing manpower, but rather 
increasing and improving system capabilities for the operator to conduct various aspects 
of tactical missions. 
To address the feasibility of reduced manning a new systems engineering 
 x 
approach and Concept of Employment (CONEMP) was developed to support the current 
platform level engagement chain. To determine the feasibility of this new construct in 
reducing CCS personnel, a system model was developed and evaluated by varying levels 
of man versus machine, the number of men supporting the CCS and the effectiveness of 




























The military importance of the United States Navy (USN) submarine force has 
been articulated in the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) and Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports [Navy, 2005] 
[CBO, 2002] [GAO, 2001].  The military value of submarines has long been recognized 
by foreign military leaders.  This strengthens the need to retain a sustainable submarine 
force and subsequently a capable Combat Control System (CCS) [China Naval 
Modernization, 2009]. 
With the cost of construction for the fast attack and ballistic missile submarines 
receiving the attention of Congress, the overall Life Cycle Cost model needs to be 
examined to ensure appropriate construction, affordable combat system acquisition and 
reasonable operational suitability costs [Navy, 2010].  Highly capable and affordable 
combat systems are key components to ensure realistic submarine construction and 
operations costs. 
Due to the sensitive nature of this project, all values used in the analysis were 
derived from open source documentation. These assumptions are used throughout the text 
and are listed in Appendix B. As this report is an academic exercise, it is intended to 
demonstrate the team’s ability to plan and execute a project from a systems engineering 
perspective. This report is intended to provide a construct from which a separate and fully 
implementable project can be developed utilizing classified parameters and values. 
A. SUBMARINE COMBAT SYSTEM ENGINEERING PROJECT 
The Submarine Combat System Engineering Project (SCSEP) is an information 
processing system that translates raw sensor data into actionable information used to 
convey an understanding of the operational environment to the supervisors. The combat 
system is comprised of both the machines that process the data and the operators that 
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control the machine and translate the data into information. The present Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) for the legacy combat system requires a contingent of specialized, 
well trained operators to gather and translate the sensor data. The intent is not to replace 
the CCS operators and their human decision making process, but rather to realize 
efficiencies in machine-based perception and comprehension by utilizing the processing 
power of computers in conjunction with people. 
B. BACKGROUND ON THE ENGAGEMENT CHAIN 
A central theme of this project is the submarine engagement chain illustrated in 
Figure 1. An overview of the engagement chain and key terminology used throughout 
this report is included to provide definitions and context for the reader. The engagement 
chain is the process for search, detect, identify, track, decide, engage and assess contacts 
in the environment. As depicted in Figure 1, the engagement chain is based on a modified 
version of Bloye’s kill chain, which is defined as a “Detect-Track-Identify-Approve-
Launch-Control-Assess” process [Bloye, 2009]. This report does not concern itself with 
the actual kill.  However, it focuses on the on-board processing from detection through 
the decisions involved with engagement rather than focusing on the engagement of 
contacts. 
 
Figure 1 Engagement Chain 
The term sensor is used throughout this report and defined here for context. 
Sensors are devices which measure energy in the submarine operating environment and 
converts it into information that the operator can evaluate as part of the decision making 
process. Sensors include sonar, imaging, Electronic Surveillance (ES) and 
communications. These sensors passively detect contacts, which emit acoustic, 
electromagnetic, visual, infrared, and radio frequency energy. Assuming that active sonar 
is rarely used in operations, only energy received by passive sensors is included. A 
Search Detect Identify Track Decide Engage Assess
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contact can be sensed by the system as either surface or subsurface. 
The first step in the engagement chain is the search process, which involves the 
use of submarine sensors to receive energy to detect contacts. As a result of the search 
process, the second step, detect occurs when the operator validates an incoming contact. 
The challenge for the combat system operator is to recognize and discriminate between 
contact details, such as Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) in decibels (dB), bearing and 
frequency content. The sensing of energy is necessary, but not sufficient, to assess if 
there is a successful detection. 
The third step in the engagement chain has the objective of identifying the 
contacts based on the contacts’ acoustic frequency components and location in the 
environment. Each contact is also uniquely categorized into classes (e.g., warship, 
merchant, pleasure craft or biologics) by its frequency content, bearing, bearing rate and 
range rate. Each contact is assigned a unique contact number to differentiate contacts 
within the combat system. 
During the identification process, the watch team monitors the categorized 
contacts for Contacts of Interest (COI) or Contacts of Concern (COC) [DEVRON-12, 
2011]. A COI is any contact that requires the attention of the contact management team. 
A COC is any contact that presents a risk of counter detection, hostile engagement, or 
collision [DEVRON-12, 2011]. 
A COI is determined by specific operational tasking or the potential to impact 
ownship safety or security. Contacts that are identified as COIs are actively monitored by 
the watch team. A COI is elevated to a COC if any of the established thresholds are 
exceeded [DEVRON-12, 2011]. 
The fourth step involves initiating the track process. During the track process, the 
contact management team uses the data from the submarine sensors and subsystems to 
determine and maintain the course, speed, and range of a contact, or multiple contacts. 
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The information gained from the tracking process is utilized to predict collisions or to 
employ the weapons system to develop targeting and firing parameters. 
The fifth step is the decide process of the engagement chain, which is the 
responsibility of the Commanding Officer (CO) and executed by the Officer of the Deck 
(OOD). He must maintain situational awareness (SA) that will allow him to decide what 
action is required. During the decide stage, the OOD must make a decisive action to 
either avoid or engage a COC. If the OOD decides to avoid, the submarine is actively 
maneuvered by changing course, speed, or depth. The sixth step is the engage process 
when the CO directs the employment of the weapons systems. The seventh step is the 
assess process which occurs following the engagement. To assess, the submarine sensors 
are utilized to determine the outcome of the engagement. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
There are many gauges by which to measure Total Ownership Cost (TOC), but 
the single largest driver is manning [GAO, 2003] [Allison, 2000]. By implementing 
Reduced Total Ownership Cost (RTOC) within the USN Submarine Force the technical 
community must manage the affordability of the next generation Submarine CCS. Since 
one important operational cost driver is manpower, TOC can be reduced by decreasing 
the number of personnel required to operate the Submarine CCS. 
The central focus of our research was on how to lower manning in light of the 
engagement chain. To assess submarine combat system effectiveness, this project 
evaluated the data flow using scenarios to evaluate changes in system parameters.  The 
project also looked at the “man versus machine” to determine the feasibility of replacing 
personnel with automated data processing. Reductions in CCS personnel must be 
accomplished while maintaining the combat system effectiveness. 
The current submarine combat system development process produces products in 
a two-year development cycle [Stevens, 2008].  This process enables evolutionary 
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changes to each subsystem, and has realized incremental improvements in the following 
areas: 
1. Open Architecture (Networking): Subsystems have been networked 
together to provide faster sharing of information with hardware independent software 
[Stevens, 2008]. 
2. Sensors: More advanced sensors and processing capability have been 
added [Stevens, 2008]. 
3. Automation: Automated trackers and “bell ringers” are software 
algorithms that have been implemented to assist the operator in the detection and 
classification of acoustic energy or visual contacts [Zarnich, 2006].  Bell ringers are 
preset thresholds that alert the operator when the threshold has been exceeded The 
improved system performance is alluded to by Stevens when he points out that the sonar 
system can turn a sonarman into an expert if they are looking at the right display and can 
interpret a quiet diesel submarine from noisy merchant vessels [Stevens  2008].  
While Stevens made it clear that these networked subsystems, advanced sensors 
and improved automated tools have increased the operator's success detecting contacts, it 
has not necessarily decreased their workload [Stevens 2008]. These improvements in the 
systems gives the operator more capability at detecting contacts, but not necessarily a 
focus on applying automation to reduce the quantity of operators [Stevens 2008]. 
The downside of this evolutionary process is that even with the intent to eliminate 
stove-piped programs, each subsystem remains developed as part of independent 
modernization programs. [Toth, 2010]  Therefore, it is not the performance of the sensors 
and/or automation of the existing stove-piped processes that needs to be considered, but 
rather the method by which the resultant data is utilized. 
An examination of the platform-level engagement chain steps (functions) is 
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needed to reevaluate the workflow and develop a new CCS CONEMP to reduce 
manning. Reduced manning levels must be reached without degradation in the overall 
submarine effectiveness. This new approach to workflow will require a new construct 
that defines how subsystems come together to form a viable, tactical CCS system. An 
assumption of this project is that a paradigm shift will be required in the way the systems 
are utilized and organized, resulting in higher “people-ware” efficiencies. 
D. APPROACH OVERVIEW 
The purpose of this project was to develop the basic concepts of an architecture 
that could be used as a construct for the next generation of submarine CCS. This report 
presents a method of reducing the manning of CCS in relationship to the platform 
engagement chain. This was accomplished by developing a new systematic approach to 
the analysis of the CCS supporting architecture and coupling it with a new proposed 
CONEMP. Scenarios were developed that represent the full range of submarine 
operations. From these scenarios, a stressing case was created to demonstrate that an end-
to-end model based on the engagement chain could be developed for the submarine 
combat system. This model focuses on maintaining mission effectiveness of the 
submarine CCS, while reducing the number of combat system personnel. 
To illustrate the concept of the project, the Department of Defense Architectural 
Framework (DoDAF) Operational View-1 (OV-1), shown in Figure 2, presents the 
proposed scenarios for the project. To construct a system model, several assumptions and 
constraints were formulated to present an unclassified treatment of the project and create 
a report that is available for public release. These scenarios utilize high contact density 




Figure 2 SCSEP OV-1 
E. SCOPE 
The scope of this project was to investigate a new submarine CCS construct that 
could reduce TOC and maintain or improve system effectiveness. A high level system 
model was developed to support mission scenario development, capability definition, and 
engagement chain analysis.  The results include recommendations for future 
development. Sensor inputs and performance are not taken into account. Sensors 
improvements are assumed to be incrementally advanced under their own program paths. 
This study addresses only the CCS suite, with respect to RTOC and effectiveness, as it 
directly relates to the engagement chain. 
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II SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
The systems engineering process section details the structure that was 
implemented in the SCSEP to define the problem, identify system tradespace, create the 
system model, implement simulations and conduct an evaluation of the system model.  
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
To execute the SCSEP project, the systems engineering (SE) approach detailed in 
Figure 3 was utilized. This approach is a modification of the International Council of 
Systems Engineers (INCOSE) State, Investigate, Model, Integrate, Launch, Assess and 
Re-evaluate (SIMILAR) process, and has been adapted to the scope and scale of the 
SCSEP. 
 
Figure 3 SCSEP Systems Engineering Model 
a. Refine Problem 
Problem refinement involved translating stakeholder’s needs and wants into a 
clear problem statement with prioritized requirements. The significant steps of this phase 
were: 
Interview Stakeholders – Stakeholders were interviewed from the Naval War 
College (NWC), Submarine Development Squadron 12 (DEVRON-12), Navy Submarine 
Medical Research Lab (NMSRL) and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) to 
gather subject matter information, customer wants and customer needs. 













submarine missions were developed based on stakeholder needs. These scenarios were 
used to outline the scope of the requirements and to evaluate the system performance. 
The mission scenarios provided focus and the initial details of how to translate the 
functions and submarine engagement chain activities into the overall system 
requirements.  The mission scenarios were also used to identify the maximum expected 
contact environment for the simulations, discussed below, as a stress test. This was done 
to ensure the CCS would be able to run under worse case loading.  
Generate and Analyze Requirements – The interviews produced a shipboard 
functional activities task list.  This was compared to the stakeholder wants and needs to 
formulate a draft requirements list. The Universal Navy Task List (UNTL) was used to as 
a source for the tasks identified for basic submarine operations, anti-submarine warfare, 
intelligence gathering, contact tracking and weapons employment. 
Refine Requirements – The initial requirements were decomposed into the 
component elements of the engagement chain. Based on the mission scenarios and the 
analysis of model outputs, the requirements were refined to achieve the best combination 
of system parameters. 
Develop Measures of Merit (MOMs) – The MOMs are the full set of Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs) derived from the 
stakeholder inputs. From the MOEs, the subset of MOPs were identified to categorize the 
specific performance metrics. Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) were selected out of 
the set of MOPs as being the most important. These MOMs are used to measure the 
goodness of the design. 
Determine the relative importance weights of the MOMs – With MOMs defined; 
the impact of each KPP was determined and assigned a relative weighting factor. These 
weights were used during tradespace evaluation to provide some quantitative information 
about the stakeholders needs in relation to the possible performance issues as the 
tradespace was explored. 
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b. Identify Tradespace 
The variables for the overall CCS system model needed to be identified as the 
basic system tradespace. These model variables required adjustment to achieve the goal 
of reducing manpower based on the identified requirements. The tradespace consisted of 
the percent man versus machine used at each workstation and the total number of men 
available. The overall effectiveness of the system was driven by the combined 
effectiveness of man and machine coupled with the allocation of workload (percent man 
or machine) at each workstation supporting CCS. 
c. Perform Modeling 
The modeling phase involved developing three models of the CCS: 
Capability Based Architectural Model – Based on the capabilities and functions 
identified during the requirements refining process, a capabilities based architectural 
model was developed. The result of the capability based architecture was used as the 
basis of the simulation model. This architectural development included determining and 
understanding the probabilities of the contact status as output by each stage along the 
processing path. This model includes the tradespace discussed previously. 
 
Probability Based Simulation Model using ExtendSim® – ExtendSim® is a 
modeling and simulation application that was used to simulate the overall performance of 
the system based on the model inputs. This model represents the construct for the 
proposed CCS architecture. Based on the data flows, contact attributes, and probabilities 
developed in the capability based architectural model, a separate model was generated to 
simulate the CCS. The model was used to provide data for analysis of the tradespace. For 
the simulations, CCS was implemented as a probabilistic abstraction of the CCS 
capabilities, and as such, represents the construct for the proposed CCS architecture.  The 
output of the probabilistic model was used to compare the KPPs, and ultimately any 
necessary adjustments that needed to be made to the overall system requirements. 
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Cost Model – A cost model was used to quantify representative savings for the 
report. The results of the system model analysis in terms of personnel reduction will be 
utilized as the basis to determine the potential savings per person, per platform. The 
resulting data will be used to calculate an overall yearly and potential ten year savings. 
The overall intent was to reflect the impact of system manpower reductions as a function 
of TOC. 
d. Evaluate Tradespace  
In this phase, the worst case scenario was used to stress the model.  The results of 
the model run were compared to the system requirements and the variables in the 
tradespace were adjusted as necessary. The output of this phase is a recommended set of 
machine constraints, manpower needs and “man versus machine” utilization. The major 
steps were as follows. 
Executed Simulations –ExtendSim® software was used to develop an executable 
probabilistic model of the CCS system. This executable model was run to simulate the 
performance of the CCS and to estimate system performance, under varying operational 
parameters. The ExtendSim® simulation model was run with 64 different combinations 
of input parameters, as discussed in Appendix C. 
Determined Trade Offs – The team performed trade off analysis by analyzing the 
output of the simulation runs. The output of the probabilistic model was used to compare 
the KPPs and make any necessary adjustments to the model variables to meet the overall 
system requirements. 
e. Final Recommendation 
The final recommendation identifies the way ahead for the CCS system based on 
the enabling technologies, potential follow on work and organizational changes to 
support fielding the CCS system. These recommendations were based on the results of 
data analysis and the overall conclusions. 
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III STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
The project stakeholder analysis consists of two parts the project stakeholders and 
the submarine CCS stakeholders. The project stakeholders provided contributions to the 
report content for the SCSEP project. The submarine CCS stakeholders are the subject 
matter experts that sponsor, acquire or use the SCSEP. 
A. PROJECT STAKEHOLDERS 
Project stakeholders include the student team members from Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center Division Newport RI (NUWCDIVNPT) and Naval Surface Warfare 
Center Division Carderock Detachment (NSWCCD) Acoustic Research Detachment. 
Advisors and mentors from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and NUWCDIVNPT 
also provided advice and feedback during the course of the project. The student team 
members performed research, conducted modeling and analysis, and developed this 
report. During the project, the student stakeholders interacted with the NPS advisors 
weekly to provide status and solicit feedback. Additionally, the NUWCDIVNPT Chief 
Engineer (CHENG) served as a stakeholder and provided feedback and guidance to the 
team periodically during the conduct of the project. IPRs were conducted that gave the 
opportunity for all stakeholders to provide feedback and recommendations on the project. 
These interactions with the project stakeholders served to provide real time feedback to 
the team allowing for valuable input and guidance for the project. Table 1 outlines the 






Dr. Jeffrey Beach NPS Advisor 
John Becker NSWCCD Project Team Member 
Shaun Cookinham NUWCDIVNPT Project Team Member 
Shawn Goode NUWCDIVNPT Project Team Member 
John (Mike) Green NPS Advisor 
David Rhodes NUWCDIVNPT Project Team Member 
Denman Sweetman NUWCDIVNPT Project Team Member 
David Toth NUWCDIVNPT NUWCDIVNPT CHENG 
Mark Wasilewski NUWCDIVNPT Project Team Member 
Samuel D. Winograd NUWCDIVNPT Project Team Member 
Table 1. Project Stakeholders 
B. STAKEHOLDERS FOR THE SUBMARINE COMBAT CONTROL SYSTEM 
Stakeholders for the submarine CCS are the people and organizations that would 
be the real world acquirers, developers, and users of the submarine CCS. At a high level 
these stakeholders fall into one of three categories: the user community, resource 
sponsors, and the acquisition community.  
Name 




DEVRON-12 Submarine CCS Tactical 
Procedure Development 
NWC Instruction and training of user 
NSMRL Psychological and Physiological analysis of users 
Former Fleet reps Submarine CCS user 




Student Team Members NAVSEA PEO SUBs 
Table 2 Stakeholders for the Submarine Combat Control System 
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1. User Community 
The user community is comprised of those that utilize and employ the system, 
instruct and train the users to employ the system, as well as study and monitor the 
psychological and physiological analysis of users. 
In order to understand the needs of the submarine crew that utilize and employ the 
system, interviews were conducted with former submariners, as well as representatives of 
the NWC, NMSRL and DEVRON-12. During the interviews with these subject matter 
experts, there were five common themes: data confidence, data timeliness, SA, trust of 
the algorithms and the limitations of human operators. 
2. Resource Sponsors 
Resource sponsor requirements were defined in terms of MOMs to capture the 
overall needs of the submarine force.  The establishment of the MOMs included MOEs 
and MOPs which reflect the importance of the Fleet needs. The RTOC analysis 
performed was applicable only to submarine personnel for combat control and attempt to 
reduce the cost of the CCS to the Resource Sponsor. A cost model was used to illustrate 
the cost savings that could be realized by the sponsor. 
3. Acquisition Community 
The Program Executive Office Submarines (PEO SUBs) and Program Acquisition 
Resource Managers (PARMS) at the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) comprise 
the acquisition community for the submarine platforms and the CCS. Each team member 
used their experience from years of supporting the PARM in technical oversight roles and 
in participation in planning and decision meetings to provide a perspective to the project 
from the acquisition community. 
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IV CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT 
The proposed CONEMP is designed to reduce the manpower needs for the CCS, 
while maintaining system effectiveness. 
The fundamental system model of the CCS is shown in Figure 4. This model 
provides context for the construct developed in this report, as well as providing context 
for comparing the current CCS CONOPS with the proposed CONEMP. In this systems 
model, contact energy is received from non-acoustic sensors (ES, Automatic 
Identification System (AIS), and imaging) as well as acoustic sensors (sonar). 
 
Figure 4 SCSEP Fundamental System Model 
Once sensor data is received, the operators must interpret, and correlate the data 
from the multitude of sensors into information that can then be provided to the 
supervisors, allowing them to form a SA picture. Forming and maintaining the SA picture 
with the current CONEMP is operator intensive. 
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The intent of the proposed CONEMP is to increase utilization of a machine-based 
infrastructure (algorithms, data processing, heuristics and machine learning) to process 
the received acoustic and non-acoustic data as though it were a compliment of expert 
specialized operators. To achieve an expert level of understanding, the lowest level data 
is assembled and analyzed using Endsley’s SA model [Endsley, 2006]. The data must be 
recognized and understood, and a solution provided to the decision makers. The role 
change proposed for the SCSEP operators will transform them into data verifiers, as 
opposed to their current role as data gatherers. The data processing algorithms must 
effectively present the correlated data as information to the operators. The operators then 
verify the information and present the information to the supervisors to decide and act 
upon. The intent is not to replace the human decision making process, but rather to 
realize efficiencies in perception and comprehension by utilizing the processing power of 
computers in conjunction with people. In this paradigm, the sensor operators are 
personnel who have collective Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities (KSA) from each of the 
CCS system elements that enable them to assess and communicate the threat profile to 
the supervisory structure. The employment of the particular capabilities is dependent 
upon the intended mission, so the operator must be knowledgeable in analyzing the 
output of various sensors. 
For this project, three mission-based scenarios were developed, and then merged 
into a single worst case scenario. During these major shipboard evolutions, the SCSEP 
model provided an assessment of the received sensor data and prioritized the threats as a 
function of range and target motion. If the model indicates a probable collision, the CCS 
operators are notified and appropriate corrective action can be taken. 
These three scenarios were used in conjunction with the proposed CONEMP to 
assess the models developed for the project to ensure the concept was modeled correctly. 
The level of man and machine was then varied to compare the effectiveness of the current 
CONEMP with varying implementations of the proposed CONEMP. 
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A. SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION 
Representative scenarios were generated in order to frame and bound the 
conceptual idea, and to provide a context for development. They focused on Ship 
Safety/Self Protect functionality and maintenance of local operational SA from on-board 
sensors and off-board intelligence. 
The basic mission flow consisted of receiving tasking from the theater 
commander. The platform then transited to the identified mission area while maintaining 
SA and contact avoidance. While in transit and on mission, the combat system team 
continuously maintained the SA necessary to convey to the command structure all 
impending issues in a prioritized manner. The SA was conducted by the use of range, 
contact type and course/speed parameters to assess the potential threat picture. The stages 
of the operational sequence diagram that was derived to develop the mission scenarios 
are shown in Figure 5 and defined in this section. 
From the transit, the platform is tasked to execute the mission. Each mission 
requires the detection, identification, tracking, decision making, engagement or 
avoidance and, if applicable, the assessment of the engagement. For each of the three 
scenarios analyzed the execution components for the scenario are identified.  
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Figure 5 Mission Scenario Construct 
The following sections outline an overview of each of the three scenarios used. 
Each scenario is assumed to consist of port egress and transit on the surface until the dive 
point. The surface transit presents the case where all of the sensors are utilized, including 
sonar, imaging, ES and AIS. The anticipated surface transit contact loading has the 
potential to receive significant numbers of simultaneous contacts. The task for the combat 
system personnel during the transit is to deconflict the tactical picture and ensure that the 
command structure has an accurate representation of the situation. 
Similarly, during each mission deployment it is assumed that the platform must 
surface to Periscope Depth (PD) either to support the mission directly or to receive radio 
broadcast messages for tasking assignments and Rules of Engagement (ROE). These 
evolutions present cases where all sensors are simultaneously receiving and processing 
contact data to reconcile the tactical picture. As in the transit case, the combat system 
personnel must deconflict the fused contact data to ensure an accurate representation of 
the tactical picture is presented to the command personnel.  























































1. Scenario 1: Undersea Warfare 
Search, Detect, Identify, Track, Decide and Engage Hostile Combatants 
This scenario consists of the ownship ability to locate, track and potentially 
engage hostile combatants (either surface or submarine) in actual combat. While 
underway, the sonar sensors make an initial analysis of the environment to establish the 
contact density and attempt to identify the COI. The system provides a means to track the 
various contact features. The sensor operators in their new role receive the sensor (sonar 
or all depending upon depth) data and assembles a comprehensive situational picture. In 
the event that a COI transitions to a COC, decisions must be made depending on the 
ROE. Ultimately, the decision must be made to track or engage. 
If the decision is made to engage, a fire control solution is calculated for the 
weapon system(s). The torpedo room is then made ready. Upon firing of weapons, the 
command and combat system operators confirm the level of success against the target. 
For surface targets, periscope imagery is utilized.  Sonar contact assessment is used to 
gauge the level of success against submerged targets by verifying the absence of the prior 
acoustic features, as well as the presence of acoustic information related to target damage 
or destruction. 
Conversely, if the decision is made to track, pursue, or avoid, SA must be 
maintained for the COC until it is deemed no longer a concern. In the case of a 
submerged COC, the sonar sensors are utilized to analyze the acoustic signature and 
monitor the system audio and to recognize the acoustic characteristics that are consistent 
with a hostile combatant. The ownship watch bill must ascertain the likelihood of the 
launch of threat torpedoes and determine evasion tactics and countermeasures. In the case 
of a surface COC, both acoustic and visual sensors may be utilized. At all times, the crew 
must maintain SA for both the COC, as well as any COI.  
The flow for this scenario follows the engagement chain.  The sensors receive 
acoustic energy, imagery or ES depending upon ownship depth. The detection algorithms 
process the data in the form of initial contact reports.  The contact reports are analyzed to 
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identify the frequency contents of data.  This interrogation of the data is performed to 
identify the contact as a COI, COC, or no threat. 
The classification of the acoustic, image or ES signatures for each contact allow 
the operator to categorize a contact as a specific vessel utilizing acoustic or visual means.  
The classification is in the form of warships (surface or submarines), pleasure craft, 
merchant vessels or biologics.  Once a contact is properly categorized, the process of 
tracking it through bearing space is initiated.  For COI and COC, an automated tracker is 
initialized.  The bearing updates are processed through Target Motion Analysis (TMA) 
on all contacts.  The contact management team is alerted when characteristics within the 
system ascertain a potential collision or significant threat posture exists.  The tracking 
process can continue for great lengths of time depending upon the tasked mission.  The 
system also must determine the threat posture based on the ROE.  If the mission presents 
the potential of hostile threats, the system posture must be set to analyze clues and report 
out threat conditions without operator interaction. 
(a) Decisions are necessary based upon the recommendations. In the case of an 
active engagement, the Fire Control solutions are calculated for COCs and the 
ROE are verified.  Then the CO must determine whether to engage, avoid or track 
the contact. 
(b) To engage, the Fire Control solutions are sent to Weapons Control (WC) for 
programming weapons.  The COC TMA solution (range and bearing) estimates 
are used to establish the final firing solution. The system operator preprograms 
the weapons and seeks permission to fire weapon(s). 
2. Scenario 2: Special Operations Force Delivery 
Covert Entry into Hostile Waters 
This scenario consists of a need to deliver SOF covertly into hostile waters. To 
achieve the objective of the mission requires comprehensive SA and understanding of the 
tactical picture. There is reliance on sonar, radar, imagery and satellite communications 
for surveillance. Ownship will enter shallow water, release a Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) 
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team and covertly exit the area. The model used for this scenario includes the need to 
cross a shipping lane to present the system with a high contact density problem, which 
stresses the system operators contact TMA, and data fusion aspect. 
The primary objective is to deliver the SEAL team and retrieve them upon 
completion of their mission. Following the SEAL team retrieval the ownship platform 
must return through the high contact density shipping lane.. 
The flow of this scenario is as follows: Ownship must enter the Mission 
Operating Area.  To achieve covert entry, the system must accurately search, detect, 
identify and track all contacts within the search space.  The operators must trust the 
contact information and understand the consequences of being discovered.  While 
ownship is deep, sensor operators receive and prioritize all initial contact reports based on 
the characteristics.  While the submarine is crossing a shipping lane and deep, sensor 
operators receive and prioritize all initial contact reports.  When in the littorals and at PD, 
sonar is used in conjunction with imagery and ES to verify the contact profile. 
Once a vessel is properly categorized, the process of tracking it through the use of 
bearings only TMA.  For COI and COC, a means to track the contact is assigned via 
automated tracking.  The bearing updates are processed through TMA on all contacts.  
The contact management team is alerted when characteristics within the system ascertain 
a potential collision or significant threat posture exists.  The tracking process can 
continue for great lengths of time depending upon the tasked mission.  The system also 
must determine the threat posture based on the ROE.  If the mission presents the potential 
of hostile threats, the system posture must be set to analyze clues and report out threat 
conditions without operator interaction. 
To execute the mission, the navigator must locate the intended shore-based 
stations, determine best landing site, and request that ownship enter shallow water.  The 
SEAL team is released to perform their mission. The submarine either exits the operating 
area or hovers until SEAL team retrieval.  Once the SEAL team has been successfully 
recovered, the submarine exits the mission area. 
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3. Scenario 3: Advance Battlespace Preparation 
Carrier Strike Group Support 
This scenario provides a forward presence to the ISR to support air operations. 
This scenario dictates a need for covert identification of all vessels in the operating area. 
Various sensors are utilized during this scenario; sonar, periscope, satellite imagery and 
intelligence. The operators are required to search the operating area to ensure safe carrier 
operations. Full tactical control and understanding of the environment are required to 
assemble SA so that accurate tactical picture data will be transmitted back to Fleet 
Commands. 
The flow for this scenario follows the engagement chain and is as follows:  While 
the system is in search mode, the sensors receive energy in the form of acoustic (via 
sonar), Imagery, or ES depending upon ownship's position in the water column. In the 
detect stage, algorithms process the data in the form of initial contact reports.  The 
contact reports are analyzed in the identification stage for frequency contents of the data. 
This interrogation of the data is performed to classify the contact as a COI, COC, or no 
threat. The track stage utilizes the contact reports as well as the frequency contents to 
maintain contact location and kinematics.  The decide stage uses the tracker outputs and 
other data (other sensors as well as contact reports, etc) to assemble the SA picture, 
enabling correct decisions by the crew.  Engagement decisions require an understanding 
of SA, as well as mission requirements. 
The classification of the acoustic, image or ES signatures for each contact allow 
the operator to identify a contact into a specific vessel category utilizing acoustic, 
electronic or visual means.  The classification is in the form of Warships (Surface or 
Submarines), pleasure craft, merchant vessels or biologics.  Once a contact is properly 
categorized, the process of tracking the contacts through bearing space is initiated.  For 
COI and COC a means to track the contact is assigned via automated tracking.  The 
bearing updates are processed through TMA on all contacts.  The contact management 
team is alerted when characteristics within the system ascertain a potential collision or 
significant threat posture exists.  The tracking process can continue for great lengths of 
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time depending upon the tasked mission.  The system must also determine the threat 
posture based on the ROE.  If the mission presents the potential of hostile threats, the 
system posture must be set to analyze clues and report out threat conditions without 
operator interaction. 
(a) Decisions are necessary based upon the recommendations. In the case of an 
active engagement, the Fire Control solutions are calculated for COCs and the 
ROE are verified.  Based on the mission objective of ISR, the OOD must 
determine to avoid or track/pursue, and as a last resort engage the contact. 
(b) Periodically, the surfacing to PD is necessary to communicate the results of 
the mission with the Fleet commanders and to receive further tasking and 
intelligence information. 
B. MISSION EFFECTIVENESS, AND NEED FOR SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS  
The ultimate goal of the submarine is to complete the assigned mission. Clearly, 
this has to do with completing mission specific goals assigned by the Navy. However, in 
order to accomplish these goals there is a set of basic requirements that have to be 
completed as prerequisites.  These basic requirements can be summarized as maintenance 
of safety of ship and minimizing vulnerability [Bundy, 2010]. This is depicted in Figure 
6. 
 
Figure 6 Basic Mission Effectiveness Requirements Hierarchy 
As mentioned previously, for the purposes of this project, many of the ancillary 
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activities that occur in the day-to-day workings of the submarine are ignored in favor of 
only those tasks that take place in the CCS related to the engagement chain. 
C. SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 
The overall progression of tasks in the combat system is directly related to the 
submarine warfare kill chain. Figure 7 depicts a modified engagement chain, which 
shows that the overall goal is typically broader than a simple kill and encompasses many 
different mission scenarios.  For the rest of the report it will be assumed that search was 
successful and the engagement chain diagrams will omit the search step  
A necessary requirement for maintaining the safety of the submarine is situational 
awareness. SA is basically a matter of comprehending the environment: if you do not 
understand your environment, you cannot maintain safety, and likely not stealth. 
Understanding, both the static (landmasses, undersea features) and the dynamic (other 
ships in the area that might affect us) environment is a key step in assembling the SA 
picture. Further, comprehension of the environment also enables good decision making 
about what actions to take to complete the mission successfully, including everything 
from how to steer the submarine to completing mission tasks. For purposes of this report, 
we will use the following definition of SA: “The perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and 
the projection of their status in the near future” [Endsley, 2006]. 
One key product from the discussions with the SME’s representing the user 
community was a review and validation of the engagement chain stages shown in Figure 
7. It was derived from interviews with retired submarine commanding officers [Bundy, 
2010] [Pillsbury, 2010], as well as team experience. The list was confirmed, with minor 
improvements, by representatives from DEVRON-12 [DEVRON-12, 2011]. This ordered 
set of stages forms the basis of the engagement chain stages. 
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Figure 7 Engagement Chain Stages 
The activities that make up SA are perceive, comprehend and project.  These 
concepts will be discussed in detail in following sections and will be mapped to the 
engagement chain. 
D. CAPABILITY AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS DECOMPOSITION 
AND ALLOCATIONS 
The task list in Figure 7 formed the basis of the decomposition shown in Table 3. 
In this table, the following pattern is used.  The highest (most abstract) level is the 
engagement chain, which decomposes into the Level 0 (L0) tasks. Not all these tasks 
were modeled, as they were deemed too detailed and difficult to model and did not add to 
the overall study. Only the L1 tasks were handled in the model. The L0 tasks could 
possibly be attempted later. 
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Table 3 Functional Decomposition and Initial Allocation 
Engagment Chain Stages → Assess






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Implement Directed Search X X X X X X X
Process Acoustic Data X X X X
Process ES Data X X X X
Process Image Data X X X
Process AIS X X X X X X X X X
Assess Acoustic Data X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Assess ES Data X X X X X X X X
Assess Image Data X X X X X X X X X
Queue Contact Data X X X X X X
Perform TMA X X X X X X X X X X X X
Fuse Data X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Develop SA X X X X
Advise to Do Appropriate Thing X X X X
Supervise Doing Appropriate Thing X X X X
Cue Sensors for Directed Search X X X X
Evaluate success of engagement X
SONAR X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
ES X X X X X X X X X X X X X
IMAGERY X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Communications X X X X X X X X X X
TC X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X














Track Decide EngageDetect Identify
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The second part of Table 3 provides the functional allocation as to where in the 
system each of the function takes place. Yellow represents the sensors, which act as 
service providers to the CCS, providing contact data. The Tactical Control (TC) and WC 
listed in Table 3 represent the tactical and weapons control subsystems of the CCS. TC 
and WC are not implemented in the simulations, but rather are noted for future 
consideration. 
E. APPLYING FITTS’ LIST 
One of the initial attempts at understanding what efficiencies could be generated 
by applying automation was to apply Fitts’ List to each of the tasks in Figure 7 [Fitts, 
1951]. While Fitts’ List is somewhat dated compared to some of the advances in newer 
computing technologies and intelligent machine pattern recognition, it was deemed 
relevant to apply the rules categorization of Fitts’ assertions to the combat control sub-
system. The practical understanding is that the implementation of a physical system 
would incorporate more modern technologies capable of discerning contacts in a 
cluttered environment. According to Fitts’ list, the human is superior at perceiving 
patterns, reasoning inductively and exercising judgment.  The machine can help in the 
area of quick response and deductive reasoning. As long as judgment is left to the 
operator, the machine as a decision aid can be helpful.  This is the reasoning behind the 




Figure 8 Fitts' List [Schmidt, 2010] 
To decide if the thought process was correct, Fitts’ List was applied to the 
Combat System task list. Each task was applied to a corresponding number indicating if 
people do better (1), machines can do in conjunction with human guidance (2), a machine 
can perform it better than a human (3), or machines should be able to do it better than 
humans (4). Figure 7 was modified to include conformance to Fitts’ List, as presented in 
Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9 Fitts’ List Applied to Combat System Tasks 
When the tasks are considered in this manner, it seems that the majority of the tasks on 
the left are better suited towards machines, where there is more raw data to process. The 
tasks more towards the right seem better suited to people.  There are fewer tasks, more 
processed data and decisions that require consideration of decision consequences (risk)..  
F. KEEPING THE MAN IN THE LOOP 
“The Navy is a service of custom and tradition, and ultimate accountability” 
[Bundy, 2010]. What this meant to this project is that due to the risk of loss of human 
life, a ground rule was implemented such that the man would not be taken out of the loop 
completely. Even though it might be feasible to develop an entirely unmanned submarine, 
it does not seem likely, given risk to life (collateral damage from improperly launched 
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weapons) and an unprotected payload of tactical weapons. The socio-political 
international consequences of being wrong on a contact are too severe. 
The fact that people are better at exercising judgment and reasoning deductively 
means the man on board the submarine should not be taken out of the decision loop 
completely. In contrast, an automated system can scan many data sources at once, 
compute all possible outputs and provide suggestions as tactical decision aids. For 
example, automation is good at comparing one beam to the next to identify patterns 
between them, and then comparing the outputs from one sensor to another for 
consistencies or inconsistencies. 
Given the above discussion, the team decided not to eliminate the human aspect 
from the submarine, but rather enhance the human by using available computing power to 
maximize their effectiveness. One of the first concepts to come out of this line of 
reasoning is that the project team needed a way of maximizing the utility of both man and 
machine, playing to their strengths, which might ultimately change the way the human 
does his job. In other words, the team realized early on this project could likely cause 
changes the CCS user’s CONOPS. This mechanism is discussed later in the Man 
Machine Tradespace section. 
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G. INTERFACES AND DATA FLOW 
The functionality in the engagement chain provides the basis of the interfaces and 
the data flow. As previously noted, the overall engagement chain tasks follow a SA 
progression. In general, in order to perform the tasks to complete the mission 
requirements, the first step is to perceive the environment. The three phases of SA can 
now be decomposed into individual tasks to be performed. An extremely high level view 
of the model is presented in Figure 10.  This figure also maps the SA activities to the 
engagement chain. 
 
Figure 10 Simulation Model High-Level View 
In Figure 10 and Figure 11, the colors refer to how these functions will be 
implemented.  If they are green, either man or machine in a tradespace can perform them. 
If it is colored red, it is predominantly human performed, although there may be 
machines acting in an advisory role. Yellow indicates a fully automated function. The 
circles represent the steps of the subsequent model and the logical mapping of the model. 
The first step in the process shows that the sensors had to be considered. The 
sensors chosen for this report are: 
• Sonar, which is broken out into Broadband and Narrowband data streams, 
• AIS, which is a transponder system not unlike Identified Friend or Foe (IFF), 
• Electronic Sensors, which detect radar systems, 
S.A.





















• Periscope imagery. 
The latter three can only be used when the submarine is at PD, so that was 
accounted for in the model as well. Each of these sensors has certain range capability and 
different output certainties. 
The longest-range sensor is passive sonar (this project does not consider active 
sonar). The problem with sonar is that because of the acoustic nature of the data collected 
it is difficult to accurately classify and practically impossible to uniquely identify every 
contact. Additionally, under normal circumstances, passive sonar does not provide range 
accuracy, and cannot differentiate between multiple contacts on the same bearing. In this 
model, sonar is broken out into Broadband and Narrowband views of the data. The 
Passive Broadband (PBB) operator uses what is called the Broadband Gram (BBG). The 
passive narrowband (PNB) operator uses what is called the Narrowband Gram (NBG). 
Classification can be done partially by sonar, but it is often aided by other sensors. 
AIS works via line of sight, but the problem is that warships and submarines (highly 
critical contacts) typically do not have their AIS transponders active.  
Periscope imagery can be used to determine both bearing and classification.  
Identification and range of the contact can also be determined dependent on the 
environment and other variables. 
Electronics (ES) can identify the type of radar installed on a contact. With some 
prior knowledge, this can also help in the identification process.  
The model data flow can now be decomposed further to add the specific sensor 
types, as shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11 Decomposed Model Data Flow 
As mentioned previously, for a successful mission, the crew needs to maintain 
safety of ship, remain stealthy, and complete the mission requirements. The authors 
suggest that completing the mission requirements is entirely dependent on how well the 
SA model is assembled and the projection of the current situation into the future. 
Successful actions depend not only on the projection of SA, but also on the mission 
requirements.  Since the mission requirements could not be satisfactorily modeled, the 
actual function “Act” is not modeled. 
 





























V SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
The SCSEP system requirements section defines the MOMs for the system. These 
definitions include the listing of the MOMs, MOEs, MOPs and KPPs along with the description, 
metric thresholds and goals, appropriate weighting factors and rationale on how the metric was 
developed. 
A. MEASURES OF MERIT 
The systems requirements for this project are reflected in the MOMs, shown in Table 4. 
These MOMs are sufficient to execute a feasibility study to reduce manning of the CCS, while 
maintaining system effectiveness. It is expected that any future work to implement the construct 
defined herein will expand this list of MOMs, as required for full system acquisition. The 
meaning of each MOM is explained below, with the rationale behind each provided in Table 4. It 
is important to note that the thresholds, goals and evaluation weights shown in Table 4 are 
assumed based on the project members’ experience within their respective discipline and 
engineering judgments. This was done to avoid security concerns, and to keep this report capable 
of being published in the public domain.  
1. CC Efficiency 
Efficiency is normally defined as output over input.  CC Efficiency can be defined to be 
the ratio of mission effectiveness to the cost of the people required to man the system.  The 
parameters for mission effectiveness are defined in Table 4 CCS MOMs.  This form of cost is 




CCE – CC Efficiency (relative) 
ME – Mission Effectiveness 

































Q P Q P 
1.0 CC 
Efficiency * 
Percent CC Efficiency  Mission 
Effectiveness/Nu
mber of men per 
shift 




    
 86.9 96.5 0.7 N/A Threshold and goals based on weighted roll-up of underlying MOMs 






Y 80 99.9 0.25 0.319 1.1.1 through 1.1.3 were balanced to ensure that safety of ship would be the 
number 1 priority in mission effectiveness, maintaining contacts would be the 
second priority, as it is common to both safety of ship and mission success, and 
finally mission success is the third priority, as most of mission success is 
already covered in 1.1.1 and 1.1.2, leaving successful completion of assigned 
tasking.  Though this might seem to be a low relative rating for mission 
success, Much of the mission success of a submarine is beyond the control of 
the submarine fleet.  Historical statistical data, as well as results provided by 
tactical trainers can provide this type of data. 
 
Threshold and goals of mission success are based on the weighted roll-up of 
underlying MOMs 
    
1.1.2 Maintain 
Safety of Ship * 





Y 95 99 0.6 N/A 





 78 93.4 0.15 N/A 





• Fusion Score 
of contributing  
sensors 
Y 70 95 0.2 0.038 It was the team consensus that, although important, fusion was the least 
important contributor to ships safety 




• Accuracy Y 50 90 0.5 0.096 It was the team consensus that TMA accuracy was the major contributor to 
mission success. 
    
1.1.3.3 
Understanding 
  90 98 0.3 N/A Although this is very important to mission success, this is really allocated to 

































Q P Q P 
Mission 
Requirements * 
more to the full combat chain of command at a very high level of a system of 
system view. 
This is not included in the modeling, as how to quantify the “understanding 
mission requirements” was beyond the knowledge of the team members, and 
no references to this could be found. 




Number of men 
required per shift  
 Y 8 3 .3 0.547 The threshold was based on the current Virginia (VA) base-line, while the goal 
of three was based on the team feeling uncomfortable with going below two  
sensor operators and one CCS operator 
Table 4 CCS MOMs 
* MOMs that are not modeled in this project. 
** Adjusted from recommended weights to compensate for those MOMs not modeled. 
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2. Mission Effectiveness 
The established goal was to maximize system effectiveness, while reducing 
manpower.  Mission Effectiveness is a function of: 
• Mission success, as defined by the mission requirements, 
• Ability to maintain safety of ship, 
• Maintain contacts. 
Mission success is partly related to completeness and correctness of 
understanding the tactical picture (environment) in addition to understanding the mission 
requirements. Mission success is measured by the completeness and correctness of 
comprehension (data fusion and TMA). The completeness of comprehension is the fusion 
score of the contributing sensors on a contact-by-contact basis.  The correctness of 
comprehension is the accuracy of TMA on a contact-by-contact basis.  Understanding 
mission requirements are the on-board command personnel’s ability to comprehend the 
mission and translate the requirements into a mission execution plan.  For the purposes of 
this project, the understanding of the mission requirements is assumed to be flawless. 




CCF - Completeness of Comprehension (Fusion) 
FSM - Fusion Score Mean 
The correctness of the modeled comprehension in terms of TMA is composed of 
the fused range and bearing confidence averages. These components represent the 





CCT - Correctness of Comprehension (TMA) 
FBCM - Fused Bearing Confidence Mean 
FRCM - Fused Range Confidence Mean 
n – Number of contacts 
Ship safety consists of personal practical safety, operational risk management and 
general safety standards [OPNAVINST, 2007]. Ship safety requires certain portions of 
the sensors to be functional, as well as the ability to fire weapons. Operational risk 
management is considered outside the project scope and is not considered. As defined in 
this project, maintenance of ship safety is the ability of the crew to make the appropriate 
(Percent of Correct) decisions by ensuring that navigation accounts for actions that avoid 
collisions and provides ample warning time to respond with evasive maneuvers. 
Maintaining contacts is the ability of the system (which includes humans) to keep 
track of the environment and vessels in it.  Vessels managed in the model consisted of 
warships, submarines, pleasure craft and merchant platforms. Contact Management is 
measured as the percent of maintained contacts. 
The percent maintained contacts are defined as the ratio of the sum of stale 
contacts per sensor to the total number of contacts per sensor. Stale contacts are contacts 
that do not get processed by a sensor within a preset time due to operator workload. 





CM - Contacts Maintained (%) 
3. Manpower Cost 
Cost in this context is in terms of personnel per shift, and represents the number 
of personnel involved multiplied by the utilization coefficient. These factors characterize 





NMen TMA Pool - Number TMA Pool  
UTMA - TMA Utilization 
NPool - Number of Men Pool 
UPool - Pool Utilization 
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VI MODEL DESIGN 
During the modeling phase, a model of the CCS was developed to represent the 
data flow between the major CCS functions previously derived. This data flow model 
implemented a queuing theory model at each workstation to represent how well the 
model could keep up with incoming contacts, vice departing contacts. 
From this “paper” model, a discrete-event simulation of the CCS was 
implemented using ExtendSim®. This executable simulation served as the basis for 
exploring the tradespace. It supported a sensitivity analysis and established an initial 
requirement baseline for key operational parameters (man power levels, machine 
strength, and the balance between man/machine interactions at the work stations).  
In order to explore system feasibility, while characterizing system operation, it is 
common practice to model a process as a series of probabilistic decisions [National 
Research Council, 2007]. Thus, for this project, CCS was modeled as a series of 
functions, whose outputs were based on probabilistic outcomes, and were based on real 
world physics and known decision processes. 
Figure 12 is an abstract visual aid that was constructed to assist in describing the 
approximate level of data within the engagement chain. This aid was constructed as a 
rough a rough correlation to the number of people required to sort through the data. The 
beige area shows the amount of raw data culled through, tapering off as higher level 
decisions are being made. Towards the right, more processed data outputs are required 
and less raw data. Currently, there are more people at the lower levels working on 
processing that data (with the aid of computers). Towards the right side of the chain, 
there are fewer people, but they are making higher-level command decisions. Because of 
the risk issues mentioned previously, it is anticipated that the decision-making command 
structure will not be removed. However, there is an underlying supposition that driving 
towards a higher level of automation in the detecting, identifying and tracking tasks will 
lower the manning requirements overall. In addition, this computational chain will lead 
into the decisions, where automation can be used to help put the SA picture together and 
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provide suggestions on the TMA and Data Fusion (combination of contact information 
into knowledge of that contact). This automation allows the machine to suggest possible 
courses of action to the command personnel, such as how and when to steer the 
submarine, but leaving the decisions to the human.  
 
Figure 12 Data versus Human for Decision 
The final architecture of the combat system (which includes man in the system) 
should be one that provides the best processing and the best decision-making. This 
balance is the crux of the model: to be able to input various levels of man and machine 
for certain tasks, and find empirically through simulation the most optimum levels. 
The model design, and hence, the high level architecture is based on the definition 
of SA: Perceive, comprehend and project [Endsley, 2006]. 
1. Perceive 
In order to comprehend the environment, the first step is to sense the environment 
and assess those sensor outputs. For this study, the number of operators was not defined 
(although Figure 13 shows notional workstations).  One of the desired outcomes is for the 
model to help determine the number of required operators. Although it is outside the 
scope of this project to define a physical architecture, one of the assumptions made was 
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that each operator console was identical, and depending on the job performed, the 
operator simply runs a different piece of software. This is like a home computer.  If you 
want to work with email, you activate an email client. If you wish to do graphic editing, 
you activate an appropriate application for that. It is assumed in this model that if the 
operator has to perform Broadband Gram (BBG) operations, he activates the BBG 
application or the imagery program if he needs to scan the periscope.  
The actual algorithms that will be used to implement the perception engine are not 
modeled in this study. However, the probabilities of the various outcomes from that 
processing are recorded. The assumption is made that the operator will have a higher 
level of automation than is currently available in the Fleet. The operator is still primarily 
concerned with what is going on at the sensor level; that is, finding contacts and 
identifying them. The model is therefore designed to vary the level of automation, 
resulting in more or less human interaction, and more or less system effectiveness, 
yielding more or less cost. 
Depending on the job and the cognitive loading involved, the operator may be 
able to handle multiple tasks. This is not unlike working on graphic editing, but 
occasionally checking email; both tasks are handled. This concept implies that operators 
can be pooled to accomplish more tasking, which allows for the possibility of the 
reduction of manpower. 
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Figure 13: The Perception Engine 
The perception engine works exclusively with sensor data, and not fused or 
combined information. The idea in the perception engine is that while the machine is 
working directly with the data, it is providing the man with advisory information at a 
sensor/contact level. 
The human operator will be able to “drill” down to see the raw data if desired, but 
otherwise the machines are creating simply pieces of sensor dependent “chunks” of data 
on a contact.  This term is merely being used conceptually to illustrate data flow, and still 
implies no particular implementation. 
The perception engine performing these computational and advisory tasks is an 
enabler. The model was based on the premise that machines are able to better make 
recommendations that assist an operator than is possible today. The required machine 
effectiveness derived from the model may be used in the future as input requirements for 
a combat system developer. 
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a. Contact Processing/Contact Assessment 
Contact processing and assessment were decomposed into two separate tasks. 
This allows for varying levels of automation. For example, the contact processing can be 
done more by machine, providing suggestions and direction to a human operator. The 
human operator acts as an assessor to the data the machine has derived for him. This 
allows more flexibility in the model without suggesting implementation.  
2. Comprehend 
The Comprehension Engine consists of those units that combine the sensor 
objects into a situational picture. It is designed to aid the OOD in putting together his 
mental model of the current situation.  
The sensor outputs from the perception engine are used to generate trackers, 
perform TMA and begin fusing those outputs together. How accurately the individual 
contacts are understood (in range and bearing) allows them to be placed in the world 
model with the other contacts with some level of accuracy. Once the contacts are placed 
in the world, the submarine command can then develop the understanding 
(comprehension) of the situation they are in. Therefore, the accuracy of the data fusion 
implies greater probability of identification. 
The Comprehension Engine, shown in Figure 14, likely has some sort of shared 
display unit in which the command team of the crew can visualize the situation, that is, 
where those contacts are placed in the world. 
The team considered Air Traffic Control as a model for monitoring several 
contacts. It was rejected because on board a submarine the world is not transparent, as it 
is in aviation. Usually the contact cannot be seen, only heard. There are no IFF responses 
available as with aircraft, and thus location is only a guess. Therefore, the SA picture 
becomes more probabilistic than absolute. This train of thought came from discussions at 
the Naval War College [Bundy, 2010]. 
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Figure 14 the Comprehension Engine 
a. TMA and Data Fusion 
Although the sensors themselves are outside the boundary of the model, a 
distribution of how each sensor acts was derived. These curves are estimated from 
interviews with SMEs and the experience of the team. They are shown in Figure 15, and 
represent the level of output energy of the contact above the background noise (that is, a 
recognition differential). The leftmost vertical (dashed) line is the cut-off between 
detectable and not detectable. Nothing to the left is detected. Everything to the right is 
detected, and there may be enough energy to place that contact in a higher category 
(whether or not the contact can be tracked, classified or identified). 
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Figure 15 Sensor Outputs and Fusion / TMA outputs 
The “fused” location (range and bearing) certainty is the maximum accuracy of 
both range and bearing of all the sensors. This table provides confidence estimates 
derived by the team with inputs derived from discussions with Mr. Williamson 
[Williamson, 2010] and team experience. These values can be verified and modified in 
the future. 
The current fleet guidance is to perform TMA on all contacts. In heavy contact 
areas, this is not always possible as it is a time consuming task, and must be continuously 
updated depending on ownship and contact motion. Therefore, the crew typically 
prioritizes based on what is most important to them at the time. This is governed by range 
(close in contacts are high priority to avoid an accident) and type (certain contacts are 
more important, such as warships). The concept of range and criticality became important 
to the model as the man-machine tradespace was developed. 
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Data Fusion is the process of combining the sensor outputs from all available 
sensors into a single target vector on a per contact basis. Washburn’s work described the 
TMA process of analyzing the contact localization and movement estimation based on 
the sensor bearing output [Washburn, 2010].  The system goal is to improve the accuracy 
of the bearing measurements in an attempt to reduce the error ellipse associated with the 
bearing data. Improved sensor accuracy, or the use of more sensors, will improve the 
contact bearing estimates which will improve the results of TMA.  
 
Figure 16 Probabilistic Data Fusion 
As with the sensor outputs, the interest was not so much in the actual details, but 
rather the confidence of how well the fusion was performed. To validate our 
methodology of deriving the fusion and TMA output confidence, we considered the set of 
performance measures for the fusion itself. This list is provided by James Llinas [Llinas, 
2009]: 
• Detection probability – probability of detecting entities as a function of 
range, signal-to-noise ratio, and so on 
• False alarm rate – rate at which noisy or spurious signals are incorrectly 
identified as valid targets 
• Location estimate accuracy – the accuracy with which the position of an 
entity is determined 
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• Identification probability – probability of correctly identifying an entity as 
a target 
• Identification range – the range between a sensing system and target at 
which the probability of correct identification exceeds an established 
threshold 
• Time from transmission to detect – time delay between a signal emitted by 
a target (or by an active sensor) and the detection by a fusion system 
• Target classification accuracy – ability of a sensor suite and fusion system 
to correctly identify a target as a member of a general (or particular) class 
or category 
While this list is generated for the data fusion itself, this study is at a higher level 
for some of these measures. That is, the concern is with the confidence of the output, not 
the output itself.  They are not used directly, but rather indirectly in the form of validating 
the contact data. 
The outcome of data fusion and TMA is an estimate of location (and 
identification) of that contact. The better the information on that contact implies a better 
location, in terms of range and bearing from the submarine. What is needed for the model 
is not the actual location, but rather the confidence of the location. Therefore, the possible 
sensor outcomes (0-4) are correlated to a location confidence. 
The location estimate accuracy, classification accuracy, and identification 
probability were included in the probability output table. This location estimate includes 
two parts: bearing and range of the contact relative to ownship position. The kinematics 
of ownship-to-contact relationship is accounted for in the variability in the contact 
distribution in terms of differing speeds, aspects and depth. 
Although time is included in the model, it is used to handle the lifespan of each 
contact (how long they are within detection range). Time is also used to for operator 
service times so that operator workload can be observed. 
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b. Trackers 
Trackers are generally used more in the area of perception to mark where the 
operator should be looking. In this project, the team elected to locate them in the 
comprehend engine. This is not to imply implementation, but rather to allow that 
sometime in the future, the machine may be able to track across sensor type, to better 
comprehend the situation. This implies a higher level of automation, and is akin to data 
fusion, which belongs in the comprehension engine. 
3. Projection 
The last part of the SA definition is "project" [Endsley, 2006]. In this case, that 
means generating appropriate recommendations for action based on the current situation. 
For example, if a contact gets too close, the submarine command might decide to 
maneuver around it or fire weapons. Each decision has risk and ramifications, and each 
depends on the mission requirements. To make the decision to maneuver, for example, 
requires an understanding of the contacts in the immediate area and the ability to project 
forward in time to predict position and avoid a collision. 
There are many possible ways of handling these situational projections. Cues can 





1 Automation offers no aid; human in complete control 
2 
Automation suggests multiple alternatives; filters and highlights what it 
considers to be the best alternatives 
3 
Automation selects an alternative; one set of information, or a way to do 
the task and suggests it to the person 
4 Automation carries out the action if the person approves 
5 
Automation provides the person with limited time to veto the action 
before it carries out the action. 
6 Automation carries out an action then informs the person 
7 Automation carries out an action and informs the person only if asked 
8 
Automation selects method, executes task, and ignores the human (i.e., 
the human has no veto power and is not informed). 
Table 5 Automation Level Descriptions [Sheridan, 2002] 
As mentioned above, the risk is too great to leave the actual performing of action 
to a machine unless a high level of trust has been developed. Developing this level of 
trust in a complex system is discussed in an article by Philip Chapel of the Australian 
Department of Defense, in which a system can be used to alert the operator to the 
presence of mine-like objects and other significant features [Chapel, 2010].  
“A useful rule-of-thumb is that, for an automated 
detection system to be trusted, the expectation of detecting a 
genuine target must be at least ten times the expectation of 
encountering a false alarm” 
Chapel goes on to describe two scenarios that may cause the system not to be 
used. First, the human operators outperform the machine, making the machine unreliable. 
Second, the operators are unreliable, especially when the detection process is too 
difficult. The expectation is to improve machine decision making processes eventually, 
but in the shorter term, it might not be possible. To some degree, the surface ship 
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community has been able to do this. The surface sonar community is more aware of the 
environment (for example, they have constant weather, Global Positioning, RADAR and 
AIS feedback). They do not have the disadvantage of relying on passive sensors and 
historical databases to define the environment as does the submerged submarine. 
 
Figure 17 The Projection Engine 
Because the actual action to be taken requires understanding of the particular 
mission requirements, it was decided not to simulate the action. Taking correct action 
depends on how well the comprehension is developed. It is assumed that the best possible 
situational picture will enable the submarine captain to make the correct decision (see 
Appendix B). Therefore, in the model developed, the actual “act” is left to the human. 
This would equate to (depending on the action) either level 3 or 4 of Sheridan’s 
automation levels. 
Some of the SA development (prediction) can be automated. Collisions can be 
projected and avoided, as well as warnings of increased probability of ownship detection. 
However, much cannot be automated. For example, some predictions might depend on 
understanding of wartime tactics. Therefore, the machines are allowed to aid in the 
decision making process (taking on an advisory role), but a human, who can not only 
comprehend the current situation, but also make decisions based on his needs, must make 
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the ultimate decision. To summarize, “Accurate choice will depend on good SA, but 
choice is not the same as SA [Parasuraman, et al., 2008]”. Therefore, this is left as a 
separate step in the model, the last step before assessment and is labeled as “Act”. 
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VII MODELING AND SIMULATION 
A. APPROACH 
As described previously in the Systems Engineering process, there are three 
models developed for this project; architectural, cost and ExtendSim®.  These are 
described in the following sections. 
B. MODEL BLOCK DIAGRAM 
The block diagram of the model is illustrated in Figure 18. It is based on the 
capabilities shown in Figure 11.  The following sections discuss the major features of this 
model. 
1. Contacts and Sensors 
The actual contact details and characterization are outside the boundary of the 
model, yet they are required to perform the processing. The contacts in the model are: 
• Warships, 
• Submarines, 
• Pleasure craft, 
• Merchants. 
The modeled sensor outcomes were probabilistically generalized, as it is beyond 
the scope of this study to directly model the performance of the sensors. Therefore, the 
sensors in the model output the probabilistic outcomes as shown in Table 6. In the real 
sensor environment, these are related to the contact SNR, as seen at the sensor’s receiver. 
These outcomes are supplied to CCS, where further processing is applied to support the 
engagement chain.  
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Outcome Category Description 
0 No Detect The system never knew the contact was present 
1 Detected The system knew the contact was there, but it was 
not clear what the contact was, and the location is 
not clear. 
2 Trackable The system found the contact, and was able to 
place an automated tracker on it. The trackers are 
not perfect, and may require manual updating in 
some circumstances such as the submarine going 
through a turn. 
3 Classifiable Not only does the system know where it is, but also 
there is enough information available to be able to 
tell what type contact it is. 
4 Identifiable Not only does the system know what type of 
contact it is, but also it knows exactly which 
vessel/hull name it is. This implies there is some 
known information on that vessel. For example, the 
crew can see via periscope imagery that the sighted 
contact is an aircraft carrier of a given country. 
There is intelligence, or they can read the number 
off the front of the contact, that it is that exact 
aircraft carrier. 
Table 6 Sensor Outcomes 
2. The Man-Machine Tradespace 
Figure 18 illustrates the tradespace in the area outlined and marked 
Man/Machine Trade-space. This tradespace consists of: 
• Percent man versus machine used at each workstation,  
• Number of men available to perform a function,  
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• Threshold used to determine if a contact has sufficient priority to 
engage “man as operator”, 
• Probability that the man will accept the machine’s 
recommendation or a more in depth review of the 
recommendation. 
The overall effectiveness of the system is driven by the combined 
effectiveness of man and machine over time, coupled with the percent man or 
machine at each workstation supporting a particular capability of the engagement 
chain. The model design permits modifying the balance between man and 
machine at any CCS workstation. In the model, this balance is maintained by the 
priority threshold. If a contact priority exceeds the priority threshold, that contact 
is presented to the operator with amplifying information, track history and track 
projection. Otherwise, the contact is hidden from the operator except as a process 
data output. If the operator is presented with the contact, the operator can either 
accept the contact or decide to validate the contact. The priority threshold can be 
thought of as a “machine sensitivity knob”, which could easily be built into an 
implementation of CCS. The machine sensitivity knob capability represents one 
of the major new architectural features of the proposed construct.  One of the key 
attributes of this tradespace detail is that, as trust in the machine as operator 
(automation) is increased, the percent man can be decreased (percent machine 
increased). 
The operational parameter that controls this tradespace is Percent Man as 
indicated by the green box in the top center of Figure 18. The Percent Machine is 
calculated as (1- Percent Man). The Priority Threshold is simply set to the Percent 
Machine used in the system. 
In addition to the machine sensitivity feature presented above, the second 
major architectural feature of this construct is the fusion pipeline shown in light 
blue in Figure 18. This pipeline is where each sensor presents its contact to the 
CCS, and where the CCS returns fused contact information to the sensors. If a 
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contact exits in the Fusion Pipe with a priority lower than the priority threshold, 
then it is simply handled by the machine and the next contact is processed.  
From a roles and responsibilities perspective, this mechanism assumes that 
the machine is acting in the operator role, providing advisory information to the 
human. If the human rejects the advice, then he is forced to spend more time 
either processing it himself or providing guidance to the machine. The human can 
become overloaded. If this happens, the threshold should be adjusted such that the 
machine is handling a higher percentage of the contacts.  
3. Contact Prioritization 
One important part of the sensor outputs is a contact strength (level of 
detection), which influences the fusion and TMA. The blue fusion pipe box is 
already described above in the Fusion / TMA output table. “Criticality” is a term 
used to identify how important a contact was to the model, so prioritization of 
contacts can take place. For simplicity, the team agreed that ultimately the 
criticality of each contact is dependent on type: submarine, warship, merchant or 
pleasure craft. A criticality value is assigned to each contact type based on how 
important the contact is to the safety and mission of the submarine.  The priority 
of a contact is calculated as a function of the normalized range, speed, direction 
and criticality of that contact. For example, a distant fishing submarine is not as 
critical as a nearby warship. As the contact approaches ownship, the priority and 
awareness increase, as illustrated in Figure 19.  Regular awareness is shown in 
green, elevated awareness is shown in yellow, high awareness is shown in gray 
and the exclusion zone is shown in orange. 
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Figure 19 Contact Prioritization Illustration 
4. Human Effectiveness 
For the model, it was assumed that the processing power will be available 
to process as many contacts as are needed. It is also assumed that the costs of 
additional processing power will be negligible in the future based on the historical 
trend of decreased hardware costs, with increased performance.  Humans on the 
other hand, have a definite processing time, which is defined by a 6-hour shift 
cycle. The human has a basic service time that is adjusted by the time in his shift. 
Each sensor type has its own basic processing cycle time. 
This model does in fact change the operators’ CONOPS. The more 
machine utilization (lowering the % Man), the human becomes a “supervisor” 
whose job it is to accept or reject the machine’s recommendations.  
This, in effect, changes the role of the human in the system. The 
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automation should be better at low level calculations and repetitive tasks (the 
menial and error-prone parts). Therefore, it is assumed that the automation would 
start there, and as it becomes better could take over more of the human performed 
low-level jobs. 
5. Pooled Resources 
Another key aspect of the model is the concept of pooled resources.  
Rather than having an individual operator for each sensor, the model relies on a 
pool of qualified operators that can be assigned to various process tasks.  This 
"pool" allows for maximum utilization of fewer operators to perform the same 
function as many specialized operators.  In the model, there are two resource 
pools, one serving the TMA function and the other performing detect and identify 
functions for all sensors.  
6. Human System Interface 
It is also assumed that the human interface is advanced enough such that 
all the information the operator requires to make a good decision is organized in a 
way that it is readily available. 
Human System Integration (HSI) is accounted for in the model. The 
Contact Service time per Sensor portion (right side, in the middle of Figure 18) 
considers this, and is adjusted. It could be said that HSI actually increases or 
decreases human effectiveness (upper right corner of Figure 18).  Also, this 
mechanism was used to generate a varying human effectiveness based on 
circadian rhythms in  
Figure 20, also supported by the model [Duplessis et. al, 2007]. 
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Figure 20 Human Effectiveness 
7. Operator Load and CONEMP 
The level of machine utilization and effectiveness was allowed to vary, 
thereby changing the model outcomes. The more automation was utilized and the 
higher the effectiveness of that automation resulted in outcomes greater or less 
than that of a near wholly human operated submarine combat system.  
One important aspect not considered in the model is operator 
complacency. Since the operator is now required to perform more (albeit a higher 
level) jobs, and if he accepts most of the machine recommendations without 
checking the data, he may lose effectiveness. The hope is that the higher level of 
data and indeed responsibility of the operator should keep him closer to the 
optimal range of attention (arousal). “Moray and Inagaki (2000) suggested that 
the attention allocation strategy could be rational and, furthermore, that 
complacency should be inferred only if the rate of monitoring was below that of 
an “optimal” observer who was required to attend to many sources of information 
(the automated task being one such source)” [Parasuraman, et al., 2008]. 
Therefore, the idea of giving him more tasks is not just for purposes of lowering 























vigilance. “Moray and Inagaki suggested that a human operator who monitored 
automation at a lesser rate than the optimal Nyquist frequency was complacent 
and the one who monitored at a greater rate was skeptical, whereas the one who 
monitored at the optimal rate was eutectic (or well calibrated)” [Parasuraman, et 
al., 2008]. 
This concept is reinforced by the Yerkes-Dodson law, in which it is seen 
that if the operator is not engaged enough, his level of performance is lower, as 
well as if he is too engaged.  A variation of the Yerkes-Dodson law is depicted in 
Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21 Arousal Level [Schmidt, 2010] 
The operator will begin to shed tasks in times of heavier stress (more 
contacts, mission area, etc.). This is the time where it is more important than ever 
to have automation (that the operator can trust) in the system to assist him. 
Too much trust in the automation implies an increase in complacency. The 
human becomes reliant on the machine, and essentially bored. Therefore, in order 
to maintain vigilance (lower complacency), the answer is not to simply lower the 
workload. Man must be kept “in the loop”, that is, engaged.  In order to 
accomplish this, more reliance on automation is required, but also the human must 
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have more tasks to accomplish. The operator is no longer bored by his job, but 
rather can accomplish more when aided by automation. This has the effect of 
raising the operator to the supervisor level, and results in his processing machine 
advisories from several different sources.  
Verification of combined machine outputs is not validated by looking at 
the raw data, but rather confirmed or denied by use of other systems. For 
example, if a contact is detected by a system, the system automatically initializes 
trackers and begins the process of classification and identification. Today, the 
human checks the inputs to this automation. The human is now forced to 
reconstruct the same process the automation has already completed. Rather, if two 
separate systems can come to a similar conclusion, then the outputs are reinforced 
without the need for a human to examine the raw data. As an example, the sonar 
operator is elevated from looking specifically at the towed array data to looking at 
the automated outputs from all the sensors combined and verified with multiple 
automated methods. This effectively eliminates operators of other arrays. 
C. COST MODEL 
The following assumptions were made pertaining to cost data in support of 
the USN's wide initiative to reduce TOC: 
• Applicable only to Submarine personnel, 
• Addresses Combat Control operations, 
• Does not incorporate effects due to personnel reduction outside combat 
control, 
o Crew’s mess 
o Damage Control 
o General ship maintenance 
• No consequence will be incurred by reducing personnel. 
The thought process is that if manning can be reduced on a platform as a 
result of applying automation to human intensive processes, then actual cost 
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reduction can be realized by the annual labor rate associated with the elimination 
of the manual tasks.  Aside from the reduction of actual labor cost by replacing a 
human operated task with a machine automated task, RTOC will be seen at the 
operating level of the platform.  This includes, but is not limited to, the amount of 
provisions (food), berthing, linen or the basic necessitates needed per sailor.  
Indirect areas that might contribute to RTOC based on reduced manning include 
the amount of oxygen the air handling system will need to generate, the amount of 
water purified and the amount of waste produced.  On an even more remote level, 
the administration of sailors, such as accountability, medical care or liability 
(annual or sick leave) could certainly contribute to lowering the TOC of operation 
of a submarine. 




Direct Unit Cost (DUC) and Indirect Cost (IC) are where the realization or 
reductions can be seen.  The Direct Intermediate Maintenance Cost (DIC) and 
Direct Depot Maintenance Cost (DDC) are assumed not affected by the analysis 
put forth from SCSEP and are therefore outside the scope of this project.  To 
reduce TOC for the future VA fleet (and others) with respect to the Combat 




RTOCVA – VA Fleet RTOC (projected at 18 platforms), 
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Future VA Fleet2020 – Quantity of VA submarines projected in 2020, 
RTOCCost Savings per Combat System – Cost Savings per Combat System. 
Table 7 shows the number if enlisted personnel on board a VA Class 
submarine. These personnel and rates were selected to show the impact of 
reduced manning for one submarine. The enlisted personnel were determined by 
analysis of the Automated Readiness Information System (ARIS) Rating Control 
Numbers (RCNs) for the USS New Hampshire [Devers, 2011]. 
















Senior 8 3 3 4 3 
Junior 9 4 4 5 5 
 17 7 7 9 8 
Table 7 Summary of USS New Hampshire Enlisted Personnel 
By coupling the data shown in Table 7 and the results that are output by 
the SCSEP model (see section VII), the number of sailors reduced on a VA 
platform can be quantified into dollars. 
Table 8 is derived from raw VAMOSC-ISR Data, converted using current 
inflation indices and illustrates the overall cost for enlisted sailors projected for 
Fiscal Years (FY) 2011 thru 2020. [VAMOSC 2010]  The ten year projected cost 
per person per platform is used to illustrate the overall magnitude of the cost 
reduction.  For example, if the reduction is in terms of 4 sailors, over the course of 
anticipated ten years the savings would be $4,141,749.  Projecting this platform 




Table 8 RTOC of Personnel Labor Summary 
 
Figure 22: VA DUC Savings Per Enlisted Sailor Reduction 
Figure 22 uses the cost data in Table 8 to show the overall potential RTOC 
for VA Class over a ten year period.  This savings only applies to personnel labor 
costs. The net cost reduction of the entire platform is out of scope of this project. 
However, numerous studies have been conducted that have addressed the net 
reduction in manning. One such study specifically focused on cost model for 
United States Nuclear Submarines [Allison, 2000]. Coupling this with other 
studies and this project's results could be used to spawn a study on net RTOC cost 
figures. 
FY Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 25
2011 1.0000 $92,757 $185,515 $278,272 $371,029 $463,787 $556,544 $649,301 $2,318,925
2012 1.0155 $94,195 $188,390 $282,586 $376,781 $470,976 $565,171 $659,367 $2,354,880
2013 1.0371 $96,199 $192,398 $288,596 $384,795 $480,994 $577,193 $673,392 $2,404,970
2014 1.0649 $98,774 $197,548 $296,323 $395,097 $493,871 $592,645 $691,419 $2,469,354
2015 1.0947 $101,540 $203,080 $304,620 $406,159 $507,699 $609,239 $710,779 $2,538,496
2016 1.1253 $104,383 $208,766 $313,149 $417,532 $521,915 $626,298 $730,681 $2,609,574
2017 1.1568 $107,306 $214,611 $321,917 $429,223 $536,528 $643,834 $751,140 $2,682,642
2018 1.1892 $110,310 $220,621 $330,931 $441,241 $551,551 $661,862 $772,172 $2,757,756
2019 1.2225 $113,399 $226,798 $340,197 $453,596 $566,995 $680,394 $793,793 $2,834,973
2020 1.2568 $116,574 $233,148 $349,722 $466,296 $582,871 $699,445 $816,019 $2,914,353
Totals $1,035,437 $2,070,875 $3,106,312 $4,141,749 $5,177,187 $6,212,624 $7,248,061 $25,885,926




































D. EXTENDSIM® MODEL DETAILS 
1. Approach 
A discrete-event simulation based on the architectural model shown in 
Figure 18, above, was developed using ExtendSim7®. The design of the model, 
as well as key assumptions and parameters, are discussed in the following 
paragraphs. 
The simulations were based on the following concepts and derived from 
multiple Design of Experiment (DOE) sources: 
• Input factors: These are also called independent variables. These 
are the inputs that the designer has control over. 
• Noise factors: These are sources of uncontrolled variations in a 
process. These have been modeled as probability functions or in 
one case a periodic function of time. 
• Output factors: These are also called dependent variables. For any 
process, there can be many output factors. It is best practice to only 
be concerned with those that relate to the outcome of the process 
that are system KPPs. 
For each sensor in the contact processing there are three input factors that 
are modeled as operational parameters: (a) percent man involvement, (b) the 
number of operators available, and (c) the effectiveness of the machine relative to 
man’s top effectiveness. 
In addition to these input factors, there are five noise factors in the basic 
model. These noise factors include: (a) the Poisson arrival rate for each type of 
contact, (b) life time for each arriving contact, (c) the signal level for each 
arriving contact, (d) the exponentially distributed service time for man as backup 
operator or supervisor for each contact, and (e) human effectiveness at any given 
time. It is assumed that once each of the sensors detects a given contact, its signal 
level is constant. Holding the signal level constant was done for simplicity.  The 
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overall effect of signal fading is incorporated into the probability distributions 
related to sensor capabilities and the TMA and Accuracy measures. 
Table 9 shows a complete list of the input and noise factors that were 
implemented to support the simulation runs. 
Unless otherwise specified, the values used for the model parameters 
described below were all assumed based on the best judgment of project 
members’ in our respective discipline and engineering judgments. 
Input Factors 
% Man BBG Process 
% Man NBG Process 
% Man Visual Process 
% Man ES Process 
% Man Update Tracker Process 
% Man TMA Process 
# Men TMA 
# Men Pool 
Machine Effectiveness 
Noise Factors 
Submarine Poisson arrival rate 
Warship Poisson arrival rate 
Merchant Poisson arrival rate 
Pleasure Craft Poisson arrival rate 
Contact life time Uniform distribution 
Human effectiveness Periodic function of time 
Human contact service time Exponential distribution 
Contact signal strength 
Based on zero mean normal 
distributions, and a function of sensor 
Table 9 ExtendSim® Input and Noise Factors 
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The output factors measured are the four simulation related CCS KPPs 
discussed above:  
• Percent maintained contacts, 
• Fusion score, 
• Accuracy measure, and  
• Number of men used. 
2. Contacts Attributes. 
In the model, contacts are generated randomly, and then each contact is 
passed to a detection and identification process for NBG, BBG, Imagery, ES and 
AIS sensors. The contacts are then assigned a status of non-detected, detected, 
trackable, classifiable or identifiable. After being processed for detection and 
identification the contacts get fused, their trackers are maintained continuously, 
for the lifespan of the contact and finally TMA is performed. At each process in 
the model, data is recorded and sent to an output Excel file for post analysis. 
The four contact types (submarines, warships, merchant ships, and 
pleasure craft) are generated via a Poisson distribution. The inter-arrival times that 
were selected were based on a worst case surface transit through the Straits of 
Gibraltar. Calculation of the contact density over a period of several hours was 
performed using VT Explorer® AIS software.  The counting included the binning 
of the contacts into the categories of warship, merchant and pleasure craft.  The 
mean time between arrivals is shown below for each contact type. 
Mean Interarrival Times (minutes) 
Submarine Warship Merchant Pleasure 
60 60 5.71 36 
Table 10 Contact Arrival Rates 
Once contacts are generated, they are assigned various attributes, which 
are utilized throughout the model. Two of the attributes are visual and acoustic 
strength. These attributes are compared against given thresholds to determine the 
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percentage of contacts that are non-detectable, detectable, trackable, identifiable 
or classifiable. The thresholds were based on achieving the probability 
distributions for each sensor type shown in Table 11. These probability 
distribution functions are derived from SME interviews and team experience. The 
visual and acoustic strength are later multiplied by the man and/or machine 
effectiveness, which results in a shift of those probability distributions. The man’s 
effectiveness from  
Figure 20 varies with time from a minimum of 0.69 to a max of 1.0 with 
an average of 0.81 [Duplessis, et al., 2007]. As man’s effectiveness decreases, he 
makes more mistakes and takes more time to accomplish tasks. The machine 
effectiveness was varied as one of the input variables with a minimum of 0.345 
and a max of 2, which is twice the range of the man’s effectiveness.  
Another attribute that is assigned to each contact is lifespan. The lifespan 
is intended to simulate the amount of time that each contact is within sensor 
range. The lifespan for all contacts was assumed to be a uniform distribution 
between 10 and 60 minutes. If contacts were not detected before they reached 
their lifespan, they were assigned a status of non-detected by each sensor. The 
lifespan was also utilized during the update tracker portion of the model. Contacts 
were cycled through the update tracker process continuously until their lifespan 
was reached. 
 Probability Distributions (%) 
 
Non-
Detectable Detectable Trackable Classifiable Identifiable 
BBG 10 30 60   
NBG 10 30 20 40  
ES 20 30  50  
Imaging 10  50 20 20 
AIS Merchants 10    90 
AIS Warships 90    10 
AIS Sub/Pleasure 100    0 
Table 11 Sensor Probability Distributions 
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One feature included to model the effects of an overloaded operator is a 
measure of how many contacts wait an excessive amount of time before they are 
processed by a person. Prior to each detection process, the model utilizes a queue 
to simulate contacts that have not been detected because they are waiting for the 
operator to have time to process them. For the NBG, BBG, and imagery detection 
processes, if contacts stayed in that queue for greater than 5 minutes, they were 
declared stale targets and assigned a non-detected status. 
3. Human Effectiveness 
Another key factor used by the model is the basic service time needed to 
perform each task. Table 12 shows the service times derived from SME 
interviews and team experience that were utilized in the simulation. The manual 
service time is assumed to be the time it takes a man to perform a task without 
assistance from a machine. As discussed in the modeling and simulation approach 
section, when the percent machine is increased, the man’s role becomes more of 
an advisory role and therefore the basic service times utilized for that process 
were assumed to be 20% of the values shown in Table 12.  
  Basic Manual Service Time (seconds) 
  
Non-
Detectable Detectable Trackable Classifiable Identifiable 
BBG 0 30 67.5   
NBG 0 400 500 255  
ES 0 4  60  
Imaging 0  10 12 63 
Update Trackers 0  30 30 30 
TMA 0  300 300 300 
Table 12 Basic Service Times 
4. Contact Prioritization 
Another attribute assigned to each contact is level of criticality. The level 
of criticality is based on the type of contact. Submarines and warships were 
assigned a value of 1, merchant ships were assigned a value of 0.5 and pleasure 
 70 
crafts were assigned a value of 0.1. The criticality was then multiplied by a range 
factor to determine an overall contact priority. The result is that closer contacts 
with higher criticality level are assigned a high level of priority. Likewise the 
lower the criticality level and the farther away the contact is, the lower its priority 
level. 
5. Contact Fusion 
The model simulates contact fusion by comparing the status of each 
contact after they have been processed by their respective sensors in accordance 
with the values shown in Table 13. Sensor contribution is based on how much a 
given sensor, independent of other factors, contributes to fusion. The capability 
contribution shows the strength of the fusion contribution, with tracking 
contributing 90% of the fusion, tracking and classification contributing 95%, and 
tracking, classification, and identification contributing 100%. For example, a 
contact that is identifiable by the NBG sensor would be assigned an NBG value of 
0.4. These scores are then used to calculate a fusion score. The maximum sensor 
fusion values for each sensor are added together and divided by the maximum 
possible fusion score (0.955) to arrive at the fusion score for each contact. 
    Capability Contribution     
Sensor  Track Classify Identify     
  Sensor 
Contribution 0.9 0.95 1    








 Imaging 0.15 0.135 0.1425 0.15 0.15 
ES 0.1  0.095  0.095 
NBG 0.4 0.36 0.38  0.38 
BBG 0.2 0.18   0.18 
      0.955 Total 
Table 13 Master Fusion Table with all 5 Sensors 
6. Contact TMA 
TMA is handled in the model by reading the status of each contact after it 
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has been processed and by utilizing the confidence values in Table 14. Each 
contact is sequentially assigned target range and bearing confidence values, which 
vary from 0 to 1 depending on how well the targets range and bearing are known. 
The target range confidence is calculated by finding the maximum confidence 
value from each sensor for a given contact.  






Non-Detectable 0 0 
Detectable 0 0.8 
Trackable 0.5 0.9 
NBG 
Non-Detectable 0 0 
Detectable 0 0.8 
Trackable 0.5 0.9 
Classifiable 0.5 1 
ES 
Non-Detectable 0 0 
Detectable 0 0.2 
Classifiable 0.6 0.8 
Imagery 
Non-Detectable 0 0 
Trackable 0.6 0.9 
Classifiable 0.9 1 
Identifiable 0.9 1 
AIS Non-Detectable 0 0 
Identifiable 1 1 
Table 14 TMA Confidence Values 
The target bearing confidence is calculated by taking an average of the 
confidence values from each of the 5 sensors. 
7. Man/Machine Tradespace 
Every contact is initially processed by a machine and then there are three 
possible follow on actions. The first action is that low priority contacts are simply 
passed on and not looked at by a person. The second action is for some portion of 
the higher priority contacts to be reviewed by a person in a supervisory role where 
he has the option to agree with the machines assessment of that contact. The final 
action is that the man reviews the other two choices are to be reviewed by a 
person in a supervisory role or to completely reprocess the contact manually. 
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8. Triggers 
Triggers in the model kick off certain processing based on Figure 15. 
Since this model is probabilistic, these triggers act like thresholds and once 
exceeded the processing of the contact is initialized. Once the contact arrival 
trigger was reached the contact was moved to the contact detection function. Once 
the contact detection trigger threshold was exceeded the contact was moved 
forward to the identify function. If at any point the contact was not generating a 
threshold level it would reach an end of life trigger and be considered a stale 
contact. 
9. Simulation Weaknesses 
There are two weaknesses in the simulation with respect to those scenarios 
in which the submarine is not always at PD. The first is that the priority of 
contacts is not adjusted once the submarine submerges, which may not be a 
reasonable assumption. While surfaced, all contacts are a concern and become a 
high priority at close range. Once submerged the model handles non-military 
contacts as low priority. 
The second weakness in the model is how the master fusion table is 
calculated. As described above, the contact fusion score is adjusted by dividing 
the fusion score by the maximum value achievable, the sum of all five sensors. 
When at-depth, there are only two sensors available. When not at PD, this was 
accounted for in post-processing of the output data, by dividing the fusion score 
output value by the adjusted maximum contribution of the BBG and NBG sensors 
and the percent time of the submarine at-depth. The maximum sensor fusion 
values for each sensor are added together and divided by the max possible fusion 
score (0.56) to arrive at the fusion score for each contact. Table 15 summarizes 
the calculations for two sensors. 
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    Capability Contribution     
   T C        
  % Sensor Contribution 0.9 1       







BBG 0.2 0.18    0.18 
          0.56 Total 
Table 15 Master Fusion Table with 2 Sensors 
E. DETERMINING SYSTEM PARAMETER VALUES 
Using DOE methods, as implemented in the JMP9® software package, 
and as described in Appendix C, the number of runs and the output values were 
determined. For this project, the DOE was set up for nine input factors, with both 
second order and two-way interaction effects. This resulted in 64 runs, as shown 
in Appendix C. 
The following are the operational parameters that represent the tradespace 
discussed above: percent man for BBG, NBG, Visual Process, ES, Update 
Tracker, and TMA processes.  Other operational parameters are the number of 
men available to conduct TMA and run the sensor pool.  Machine effectiveness 
versus human effectiveness also contributes to the tradespace parameters. One 
method to determine the optimum values is to run a series of experiments, with 
the input values determined by the DOE methods [Yang, 2009]. The JMP9® 
software analysis package provides a custom DOE module that allows a fractional 
factorial DOE screening that identifies those input factors to which the system is 
either sensitive or insensitive. In addition, the software was used to determine 
sensitivities to interactions between input factors and powers of the input factors. 
For this project, two way interactions and second order powers were utilized.  In 
order to perform a DOE, the range over which each parameter had to be evaluated 
was specified. Table 16 below shows the range for each, with rationale for range 
selection. 
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Input Parameter Low value 
High 
Value Range Rationale 
% Man BBG Process 25 75 High value: The current implementation for 
each is already somewhat automated, with an 
estimate of 25% machine contribution (75% 
man). 
Low Value: The basic assumptions on the 
machine effectiveness and speed of machine 
based decisions, vice man, would typically 
drive these parameters to the low end; 
however, this is limited to 25% as it was felt 
that full automation of a submarine would be 
too risky.  
% Man NBG Process 25 75 
% Man Visual Process 25 75 
% Man ES Process 25 75 
% Man Update Tracker 
Process 
25 75 
% Man TMA Process 25 75 
Number of Men TMA 
Process 
1 4 High Value:  The number of operators per 
shift currently assigned to the task 
Low Value: The minimum based on 1 
operator per sonar sensor, plus sharing EW, 
one for TMA, and one for TMA 




relative to man 
0.345 2 High value: Based on twice the maximum 
man effectiveness used in the model. 
Low Value: Based on 1/2 of the minimum 
man effectiveness used in the model.  
Table 16 Combinational DOE inputs 
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VIII MODELING RESULTS 
A. OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS 
Table 17 shows the optimal values for the CCS operational parameters resulting from 
JMP9®’s Optimization analysis of the 64 runs defined by JMP9®'s DOE module, as described 
above. 
















75 75 75 25 75 75 1 3 2 
Table 17 CCS Optimized Operational Parameters 
B. KEY PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS 
The KPPs and their weights for the architectural construct are listed in Table 18. The 
operational values from Table 17 and Table 18 were then used in the ExtendSim® model and a 
simulation was run to determine the resulting KPP average values. 
Table 18 shows the resulting KPP values and scores with the corresponding CCS score. 
Also shown are the results for the same operational parameters, with the machine effectiveness 
set to 0.5 and 1, relative to man effectiveness. 
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 KPP Bounds 
Scoring 
Run 
Scoring weight 0.3191 0.0383 0.0960 0.5470 
Score Threshold 0.8 0.7 0.5 8 
Goal 0.999 0.95 0.9 3 
Optimized Values 1.000 3.480 0.839 3.193 0.965 
Resultant Scores 1.000 1.000 0.848 0.961 
Min Machine Average Values 
0.9974 0.8496 0.7419 3.1888 0.924 
Resultant Scores 0.992 0.598 0.605 0.962 
Mid Machine Average Values 
0.9996 1.3030 0.7997 3.1164 0.964 
Resultant Scores 1.000 1.000 0.749 0.977 
Table 18: CCS KPP Values and Scores 
C. ARCHITECTURE 
It was demonstrated that the architecture constructs shown in Figure 23 and Figure 24, 
when implemented with high levels of automation and the KPPs shown in Table 18, would 
provide a robust CCS. 
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Figure 23:  High Level CCS Architectural Framework 
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L1 Architectural Framework, with Generic Sensor Input
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D. COST MODEL 
The results of the system modeling and simulation allow a reduction in manpower 
from between six to ten operators per shift in the current VA operational base-line to four 
operators per shift, with an average utilization of 34.1%. This 52% reduction in 
manpower utilization will potentially save the Navy $41.7 million per year. 
From the results of the modeling with a high level of automation, the entire 
combat system personnel per platform decreased from 48 sailors to 23. The four shifts, at 
four people per shift amounts to 16 CCS personnel. Since the TM rate of seven is 
assumed to remain constant across current and future systems, this brings the total 
combat system billet count to 23 as shown in Figure 25. This RTOC amounts to a total 
CCS personnel savings of 25 per platform and over the course of ten years amounts to a 
projected yearly savings of nearly $42 Million dollars as shown in Figure 26. The total 
projected savings over the course of ten years amounts to $465.9 million as shown in 
Table 19. 
 


















Table 19 VA Fleet Cost Savings Per Enlisted Sailor Reduction 
E. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Figure 26 depicts the graphical summary from the previous cost analysis. The 
derived savings above were based on a simple average DUC (salary and other 
compensation) across all of the enlisted billets in Table 7. An average of DUC was 
selected to simplify the analysis. 
 
Figure 26 VA Fleet Cost Savings 25 Sailor Reduction 
It can be seen from Figure 26 that by reducing the VA submarine force between 4 
to 25 sailors between $6.7M and $41.7M.  Extending this savings over a ten year period 
can result in a potential savings between $8.4M to $52.5M. 
FY Index 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 25
2011 1.0000 $1,669,626 $3,339,264 $5,008,896 $6,678,527 $8,348,159 $10,017,791 $11,687,423 $41,740,650
2012 1.0155 $1,695,514 $3,391,028 $5,086,542 $6,782,056 $8,477,569 $10,173,083 $11,868,597 $42,387,847
2013 1.0371 $1,731,579 $3,463,157 $5,194,736 $6,926,315 $8,657,894 $10,389,472 $12,121,051 $43,289,468
2014 1.0649 $1,777,935 $3,555,870 $5,333,805 $7,111,741 $8,889,676 $10,667,611 $12,445,546 $44,448,379
2015 1.0947 $1,827,717 $3,655,435 $5,483,152 $7,310,869 $9,138,587 $10,966,304 $12,794,021 $45,692,934
2016 1.1253 $1,878,893 $3,757,787 $5,636,680 $7,515,574 $9,394,467 $11,273,361 $13,152,254 $46,972,336
2017 1.1568 $1,931,502 $3,863,005 $5,794,507 $7,726,010 $9,657,512 $11,589,015 $13,520,517 $48,287,561
2018 1.1892 $1,985,585 $3,971,169 $5,956,754 $7,942,338 $9,927,923 $11,913,507 $13,899,092 $49,639,613
2019 1.2225 $2,041,181 $4,082,362 $6,123,543 $8,164,724 $10,205,904 $12,247,085 $14,288,266 $51,029,522
2020 1.2568 $2,098,334 $4,196,668 $6,295,002 $8,393,336 $10,491,670 $12,590,004 $14,688,338 $52,458,349
Totals $18,637,866 $37,275,745 $55,913,617 $74,551,489 $93,189,361 $111,827,234 $130,465,106 $465,946,659

































The intent of this project was to develop a construct to demonstrate that a new 
approach to the CCS in an end-to-end engagement chain context and high level 
automation can reduce the CCS TOC to the Submarine Force. It was shown that effective 
SA with reduced manpower is feasible by adopting a new CONEMPS that achieves the 
following: (a) allocating the various engagement chain functions to a combination of 
people and machine, (b) changing from man-as-operator to machine-as-operator, (c) cross 
training the CC crew to enable the use of personnel pools at the sensors and trackers.  
A modified SIMILAR systems engineering model was used to create the 
construct and define the system functions to construct an ExtendSim® model to evaluate 
the system under stress case conditions. Based on the DOE, the ExtendSim® model 
settings were adjusted to measure the KPPs and prove that the CCS can be operated with 
a crew of four persons per shift.  To achieve this level of personnel in the future system 
development, a new approach to the fundamental operator KSAs, HSI and training 
systems will need to be implemented by the Submarine Force. 
By adopting this change in the system development the reduction in personnel 
from (48) to (23) can save the Submarine Force on the order of a $42 Million dollars in 
DUC annually. This reduction amounts to a 52% reduction in manpower utilization 
which is a projected savings over the course of ten years amounts to $465.9 million 
dollars.   These results are summarized in Table 20.  This savings does not account for 
any of the other annual unit cost savings such as the indirect costs (IC) and maintenance 
costs (DIC and DDC). The operations and maintenance requirement assessment of the 
system will be necessary to ensure that the maintenance of the equipment does not burden 
the personnel based on the overall reduction and collateral duties such as damage control. 
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Personnel Per Platform DUC 
VA Fleet Ten Year 
Savings 
VA Combat System CCS Reduction $M 
48 23 52% 42 465.9 
Table 20 Summary of Reduction Results 
The results of the ExtendSim® modeling upheld the reduction in personnel in the 
CCS based on the proposed CONEMP.  The modeling showed that accounting for 
automation and human effectiveness levels would produce an effective CCS. The model 
settings validated that the engagement chain functions can be accomplished with high 
level automation and a minimum of four persons per shift.  
The human CCS operator has to act in a more supervisory role, taking a higher 
level viewpoint of the situational picture.  This allows him to not only understand a small 
niche of data, but also a higher level of information. This required level of information 
certainty demands a greater level of trust in the system, which has yet to be proven. It is 
imperative that the human not be removed from the processing loop for a few reasons 
including: 
1. The socio-political risk is too great for a fully automated armed system. 
2. Without enough interaction, the human may become complacent, relying 
on automated outputs and lowering his overall situational mental model correctness. 
Increasing automation, yet keeping the man in the processing loop with sufficient 
workload to maintain vigilance, will effectively elevate him to a supervisory role.  This 
allows the machines to act in an advisory role to the human, affording trust in the data. 
To support that supervisory role, the human needs to work across multiple sensors. The 
best way to realize these conflicting requirements is to re-align the human from being an 
expert in a particular job to becoming a more highly trained “super” operator across 
several tasks.  He also needs to work in a “pool” of human resources that can be applied 
as required by the situation. 
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Based on the modeling and analysis completed during this project, it is feasible to 
implement a CCS that reduces operational cost by a total of $465.9 million dollars over 
ten years. These results were achieved using the operational values listed Table 21. 
















75 75 75 25 75 75 1 3 2 
Table 21 Operational Results 
It is noted that the machine effectiveness listed in Table 21 may be difficult to 
achieve due to the investment needed to develop intelligent systems capable of expert 
operator performance. Thus, further analysis was performed to estimate the system 
performance with a machine effectiveness assumed to be one-half and equal to man 
effectiveness.  In both cases it was shown that although there is a decrease in system 
performance, the change is small. Therefore, it is concluded that it is unnecessary to wait 
for the machine effectiveness to achieve 200 percent of man effectiveness to implement 




A. ROADMAP TO IMPLEMENTATION 
In order to implement the derived construct, there are required refinements to the 
model, as well as certain enabling technologies needed to implement a truly integrated 
combat system that supports the balance of man to machine demonstrated by this project. 
It is also anticipated that significant changes in acquisition and employment of the 
submarine systems will be required in order realize this construct. These changes can be 
categorized as enabling technologies, follow-on development work, and organizational 
changes. Changes in the approach to acquisition are anticipated but are beyond the scope 
of this technical project. 
B. ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES  
The detailed hardware design, algorithm development and system architecture are 
beyond the scope of this project.  However, factors that must be considered in the design 
and implementation of a construct that would support the future SCSEP construct are 
addressed in the following sections.  
1. Architectural Elements 
The inclusion of modern components and forms of implementation, such as 
massively parallel processing, self-learning, fuzzy logic, genetic and heuristic software 
elements should be investigated to increase system effectiveness. These can be 
introduced as adjunct elements that override the current approach of pre-programmed 
algorithms that exist in a fixed stove-piped procedural architecture. 
2. Hardware 
Key factors in the selection of hardware are the efficient sharing of resources, 
commonality and redundancy.  Servers that can be utilized for diverse processing 
functions will enable efficient use of the hardware.  For example, processing power 
allocated to imaging and ES during PD operations will be reallocated to sonar processing 
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while submerged.  Similarly, while preparing for and at PD, these same processors will 
reallocate near real time to support the varying sensor loads.   
Commonality in the hardware will be crucial both to support the allocation of 
varying sensor loads and to enable the concept of pooled maintenance divisions.  By 
utilizing common hardware across the platform, the need for specialized technicians will 
be reduced. 
Redundancy in the hardware and the failure modes of the architecture must be 
fully considered and addressed in the design of the future SCSEP. Due to the severe 
consequences involved, all hardware must be fail safe and critical hardware must be 
designed to allow for manual operations in the event of failure.  The failure modes must 
be such that failures allow the operator to maintain SA by a gradual transition from 
higher to lower level of automation. 
3. Algorithm Development 
The algorithms developed to support the SCSEP construct must be functionally 
verified and reliable.  As previously discussed, the crew must trust the automation.  Since 
the undersea acoustic performance is environment dependent, both in-lab and at sea 
testing would be required to certify the algorithms. Similar to the hardware, the algorithm 
development must produce software with high reliability and graceful failures. 
Redundancy in the functions will provide reliability both in the execution of the 
functions and in the error checking of the functions.  Multiple independent algorithms 
error checking each other will provide a more robust design that will serve to reduce 
single points of failure and will better account for the extremes of the operating 
environments. 
Limitations of the algorithms must be accounted for in the failure modes.  The 
algorithms must account for their inherent limitations and provide a graceful transition to 
lower levels of automation as system limitations are approached and exceeded. Fail safe 
and operational requirements must be considered and appropriate requirements allocated 
to the algorithms during the design stage. 
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4. Machine Effectiveness 
Machine effectiveness is a combination of algorithm and machine efficiency, and 
algorithm accuracy. Table 16 shows that there are small changes in system performance 
relative to machine effectiveness when the machine is set to a range of 0.5 to 2 times 
human effectiveness. Therefore, this construct can be introduced once the lower level of 
machine effectiveness is achieved. 
The perception engine must be better able to perform computations and output 
advisory contact information. While automation is partially implemented now in the form 
of trackers and bell ringers, the scope of automation needs to be greatly expanded in 
order to enable the suggested architecture. This research is ongoing at a sub-system and 
stove-piped level, but advances in this area, across sensors will be required. 
In order to allow the human to trust the machine, algorithms must be advanced to 
lower the number of both type I (false alarms) and type II errors (missing a real contact). 
As suggested in the Model Design section, “the expectation of detecting a genuine target 
must be at least ten times the expectation of encountering a false alarm” [Chapel, 2010]. 
Without this low false alarm technology, the automation will not be trusted, resulting in 
the human trying to do too much of the work himself.  In this case, the operators will 
either: 
• Shed tasks, thus becoming less effective, or 
• Miss needed contacts, or 
• Contacts will be prosecuted cursorily. 
This could result prioritizing a contact incorrectly. 
5. Human System Integration 
HSI is a critical component of any design.  However, in a highly automated 
design such as the SCSEP, the effective integration of the human operators and the 
automation is particularly essential.  The data processed by the automation must be 
displayed as actionable information to the operators.  In addition to the data processing 
algorithms, automation to prevent and detect human error will be a key factor in a 
 87 
successful design to support reduced manning.  With low levels of automation, the 
increased manning levels provide multiple eyes checking the information processed by 
the operators and the decisions made by the supervisors.  With reduced manning, the 
automation must account for this element of human error checking.  Trip wires should be 
determined and bell ringers implemented to alert the supervisor when potential human 
error is detected. 
C. OTHER FOLLOW-ON WORK 
1. More Detailed Functional Decomposition 
For the model, only the Level 1 functions, as described in the functional 
decomposition shown in Table 3and Figure 7 were considered. This work could be 
extended to a more detailed look at the tasks and thus perhaps improved effectiveness 
requirements for implementation of automation. 
Figure 15 shows the distributions used for TMA and Data Fusion. While it was 
outside the scope of this report to actually implement these algorithms, the distributions 
used were derived from interviews and personal experience. Further research could be 
performed to confirm or update these numbers, including research that would investigate 
new techniques and algorithms that might improve these values. This would involve 
looking at newer techniques for tracking contacts, or fusing data across sensors. 
2. Expand the “Projection” Portion of SA into the Effectiveness Equation 
In the decomposition of SA “projection”, it was determined that to actually 
simulate the “act” portion of the engagement chain would be very complicated. This is 
due to the fact that models of people would be required to simulate performing actions 
and interpret mission requirements.  For example, when the platform comes across a 
contact, it could shoot or maneuver.  Whether to shoot or not requires understanding of 
the mission: Is the object of the mission to actually eliminate the contact?  If not, there 
are ramifications to doing so. Indeed, it is an assumption that the submarine command 
will make the correct decision given good information. A method of advancing the 
mission requirements into the model, or even a better value for how well command 
responds to a situation, could be investigated. 
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3. Additional Sensors 
Only certain sensors were considered, partially to keep this report unclassified. 
Additional sensors could be considered such as active sonar. As another example, reliable 
ship-to-ship communications might be considered to share sensor and contact data across 
platforms. Once these are considered, the results from the sensors could be improved by 
allowing directed searches, or being cued to specific contacts. This is an extension of the 
“fusion pipeline” discussed above, and the net effect would be a consolidated federation 
of networked sensors. 
4. More detailed Understanding of the Cost of Manning 
Consider all the costs involved in manning, not just the direct costs. There are 
many costs to manpower: training, room, board, equipment, salary, support (secretaries, 
human resources offices), overhead (heat, light and paper), etc.  As a result of the reduced 
personnel, overall reductions in cost can be realized in terms of onboard support 
equipment such as computer infrastructure and tooling; as well as a reduction in land 
based administrative support requirements. 
5. Other Possible Related RTOC Sources 
In addition to the manpower cost savings, there are other areas where cost savings 
can be gained as part of technology upgrades to the CCS.  As the manpower reduction is 
realized, there could be a corresponding decrease in the needed foot print: 
• Reduced habitability; rack, oxygen generation, personal safety equipment, 
provision storage and galley space, or 
• Reduced number of operator workstations. 
This reduction in habitability and equipment footprint would provide much needed areas 
for additional hardware, cabling and systems needed to provide a reliable automated 
CCS. 
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D. IMPLEMENT FINAL FUNCTIONAL ALLOCATION, ACCORDING TO 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES 
It is anticipated that the reduced manning and changes in employment will require 
changes in the crew organization. Currently the crew is organized by departments, which 
are further organized into divisions. Departments are led by officers who serve as 
department heads. The department heads are responsible for the divisions that make up 
their department. The divisions are managed by junior officers who serve as division 
heads. A senior enlisted crew member or lead petty officer (LPO) coordinates with the 
division head to manage the enlisted crew that comprise the division. The division heads 
manage both the operational and maintenance duties of the crew. The current 
organization is based partly on the stove piped employment of the sensors. The left of 
Figure 27 shows the current divisions on the VA class submarine [USS New Mexico, 
2011]. It is anticipated that the organization of the divisions will be modified resulting in 
fewer divisions. Additionally, it is anticipated that the division organization will be 
further subdivided into operational divisions and maintenance divisions as shown on the 
right of Figure 27.  
 
Figure 27  Personnel Breakdown 
1. Operational Divisions and Maintenance Divisions 
The enlisted crew members responsible for the combat systems have two primary 
functions, which are to serve as operators and maintainers. Currently the enlisted fleet 
that comprises the Submarine Electronics / Computer Field (SECF) is organized by 
specialty ratings identified as Sonar Technician Submarine (STS), Fire Control 
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Technician (FT), and Electronics Technician (ET). The ET rate is further divided into 
Navigation (ET-Nav) and communication (ET-Comms). [Powers, 2011] The crew that 
fill these ratings have specialized training based on the unique sensors they maintain and 
operate. Just as the combat system will be re-architected to eliminate the stove piped 
sensors employment, the divisions will need to be organized to eliminate the stove piped 
operator concept. A pool of independent sensor operators must be available. These 
operators will adjust their focus as the operational environment dictates. For example, 
while submerged deep in an environment saturated by acoustic contacts, operators will 
process the automation representation of the sonar sensor information. As the submarine 
arrives at PD, and visual and ES contacts increase, more operator focus could potentially 
utilize the automation output of the fused sensor data from all available sensors. The old 
CONEMP dependent on Sonar operators and ES operators and Imaging operators will be 
replaced by a revised CONEMP, which involves versatile combat system operators. 
Similarly, the officers and supervisors will need to adapt to supervise the combat 
system as opposed to supervising sensor specific data. The legacy Fire Control 
Technician of the Watch (FTOW) and Sonar Supervisor roles would be replaced by a 
single combat system supervisor in low contact density environments. As the contacts in 
the environment increase, an additional combat system supervisor could be called upon 
from the supervisor pool. 
The focus of this report is on the operational aspects of the combat system but the 
required maintenance cannot be totally ignored. Therefore, it is anticipated that the 
maintenance divisions will be reorganized into specialized sensor specific maintainers 
and sensor diagnostic computer system and LAN maintainers. This organization allows 
the reduction in manning realized by replacing the stove piped specialized operators not 
to impact the maintainability of the equipment. The same pooled operators will support 
maintenance of the common hardware utilized for backend sensor processing. Due to the 
uniqueness of the sensors, it is anticipated that a small specialized sensor maintenance 
division will still be required but reduction in the overall maintenance force will still be 
realized. 
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2. Changes in Training 
As discussed, the roadmap must include migration from stove-piped division of 
operators within the SECF to a pooled SECF division of operators. The enlisted 
technicians would need to be cross-trained as operators. This pool of operators must also 
be trained to function as a pool of maintainers for the common equipment. While the 
need for specialists to support unique sensor maintenance cannot be eliminated, the 
roadmap must reduce the number of specialized roles. 
3. Changes in Culture 
Automation is implemented for two primary reasons: to reduce operator workload 
and to increase vessel safety and effectiveness. To be successful, the end user must 
effectively work with the automation, using and trusting the tools, but also understanding 
what automation is doing. If the user does not trust the automation then it will not be 
accepted and will not be used. Conversely if the user places too much trust in the 
automation then catastrophe can result if the automation fails or when the limits of the 
automation are exceeded and manual control must be regained instantly. 
“The Navy is a service of custom and tradition” [Bundy, 2010]. The roadmap to 
implementation must address the changes in custom and tradition, which will be 
represented by the elimination of stove-piped sensor based operators and the introduction 
of pooled combat system operators. It is anticipated that time will be required for the 
crews to become accustomed to the changes represented by this new CONEMP. This is 
similar to the time that was required for the crews to become familiar with and accepting 
of visual sonar waterfalls as opposed to aural sonar and the transition from optical based 
imaging to sensor based imaging. The critical factor required for acceptance of the 
change will be trust in the new CONEMP and trust in the algorithms that make the new 
CONEMP realizable. 
Paramount to building trust in the automation CONEMP is data confidence. For 
man to trust the automation he needs to understand why the algorithm is making any 
given recommendations. Man usually trusts the algorithm if it is recommending low risk 
maneuvers.  It is when the algorithm recommends something that is risky that man 
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questions it. Man then spends time questioning the algorithm instead of reacting. The 
man needs to be able to sense when to question what the automation is reporting. 
Otherwise, if it breaks he will not know how to react and he will not know when it has 
failed. An example is autopilot on airplanes – the pilots trust the automation but they also 
are trained to know when they need to take over.  
In order to support a gradual shift in culture, a phased approach could be 
implemented where the levels of automation increase as the data confidence and the 
Fleet’s trust of automation increases. The more the automation increases, the more 
critical it will become for fail safe implementations, which provide redundancy not just in 
the hardware but also in the software to eliminate single point failures. Studies have 
shown that when automation failures occur that require the user to return to full manual 
control, the higher the Level of Automation (LOA) at the time of the failure, the more 
difficult it is for the operator to return to manual control [Di Nocera, 2005]. With a highly 
automated CCS, it could be catastrophic if the automation failed and the crew had limited 
time to regain control and regain SA at the level required for full manual control. 
Therefore, the automation that will allow the reduction in personnel must be implemented 
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XIII APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS 
AIS Automatic Identification System 
AoA Analysis of Alternatives 
ARIS Automated Readiness Information System 
BBG Broadband Gram 
C2 Command and Control 
CBO Congressional Budget Office 
CC Combat Control 
CCE Combat Control Efficiency 
CCF Completeness of Comprehension (fusion) 
CCS Combat Control System 
CCT Correctness of Comprehension (TMA) 
CHENG Chief Engineer 
CM Contacts Maintained 
COC Contact of Concern 
COI Contact of Interest 
CONEMP Concept of Employment 
CONOPS Concept of Operations 
CRS Congressional Research Services 
CS Combat System 
DDC Direct Depot Cost 
DEVRON-12 Submarine Development Squadron Twelve 
DIC Direct Intermediate Cost 
DoDAF Department of Defense Architecture Framework 
DOE Design of Experiment 
DTIC Defense Technical Information Center 
DUC Direct Unit Cost 
EFFBD Enhance Functional flow Block Diagram 
ES Electronic Sensor 
ESM Electronic Surveillance Measure 




FBCM Fused Bearing Confidence Mean 
FRCM Fused Range Confidence Mean 
FSM Fusion Score Mean 
FT Fire Control Technician 
FTOW Fire Control Technician of the Watch 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
HSI Human System Interface 
IC Indirect Cost 
IDEF0 Integration Definition for Process Modeling 
IFF Identification Friend or Foe 
INCOSE International Council of Systems Engineers 
IPR In Process Review 
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 
KPP Key Performance Parameter 
KSA Knowledge, Skills and Abilities 
LAN Local Area Network 
LOA Level of Automation 
LOS Line of Sight 
LPO Leading Petty officer 
ME Mission Effectiveness 
MLO Mind-like Objects 
MOE Measures of Effectiveness 
MOM Measures of Merit 
MOP Measures of Performance 
NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command 
NBG Narrowband Gram 
NPS Naval Postgraduate School 
NSMRL Naval Submarine Medical Research Laboratory 
NSWCCD Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division 
NUWCDIVNPT Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division Newport 
NWC Naval War College 
OOD Officer of the Deck 
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OV-1 Operational View 1 
PARM Program Acquisition Resource Manager 
PBB Passive Broadband 
PD Periscope Depth 
PEO SUB Program Executive Office, Submarines 
PNB Passive Narrowband 
RCN Rating Control Number 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
RTOC Reduced Total Ownership Cost 
SA Situational Awareness 
SCSEP Submarine Combat Systems Engineering Project 
SEAL Sea, Air and Land 
SECF Submarine Electronics / Computer Field 
SIMILAR State, Investigate, Model, Integrate, Launch, Assess Re-evaluate 
SME Subject Matter Expert 
SNR Signal to Noise Ratio 
SOF Special Operations Forces 
STS Sonar Technician Submarine 
TM Torpedo Man 
TMA Target Motion Analysis 
TOC Total Ownership Cost 
TPM Technical Performance Measure 
UNTL Universal Naval Task List 
USN United States Navy 
VA Virginia 
VAMOSC Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
VHF Very High Frequency 
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XIV APPENDIX B: ASSUMPTIONS 
The following section outlines the various assumptions that were made 
throughout the engineering effort. 
A. SCSEP PARADIGM SHIFT 
An assumption of this SCSEP project is that a paradigm shift will be required in 
the way the systems are developed, utilized and organized, resulting in higher “people-
ware” efficiencies. The current stovepiped programs of record independently create 
acquisition systems as part of new construction and modernization programs with 
differing development schedules. In addition to the systems being developed 
independently, the operator training products are developed independent of other 
systems. 
To achieve the goal of a single end-to-end system, the consolidation of the system 
development would need to occur to focus specifically on creating a single CCS system. 
Interfaces for a consolidated CCS would focus on the data flow to ensure that the correct 
information is exchanged between system functions. The sensor operator interface would 
need to be created to present situational knowledge instead of low level scientific data. 
To operate the system, CCS sensor operators will need to be trained in technical 
areas that are currently billeted across several current shipboard systems. The operator 
pool concept that is introduced in this project leverages the cross trained operator KSAs 
to achieve a better utilization of the sensor operator’s time “people-ware” efficiencies. 
B. HUMAN VERSUS MACHINE TRADESPACE  
The intent of this project is to assess the feasibility of replacing the functionality 
of the CCS with machine based processing by varying the functional human versus 
machine ratio in the detection, identification, tracking, decision, engagement and 
assessment of the submarine engagement chain. This effort results in an overall analysis 
into the staffing levels for the Combat System including STS, FT, TM, ET and 
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Radioman. With a shipboard compliment of (48) CS persons, a reduction in personnel 
could achieve a significant cost savings. 
C. FOCUS ON COMBAT CONTROL ONLY 
To quantify the RTOC the analyses that are contained within this report are 
focused on the level of manning specific to the combat system. The team realizes that 
there are other responsibilities associated with non-combat system related functions such 
as damage control, equipment maintenance, messing, berthing and general housekeeping. 
The impacts to the overall reduction outside the combat system are not considered. In 
addition, the team assumes that there will be no negative consequences incurred as a 
result of reducing personnel. 
The TM rate was not included as part of the overall reduction in the CCS operator 
pool calculations.  The focus was on the inboard processing of the sensor data up to the 
point of decisions to act, therefore all components of the weapons programming, 
placement and launch control were omitted from this project.  Also, the operations 
perspectives of the CCS were identified with respect to personnel only. The maintenance 
activities and approach will need to be evaluated in a similar method to substantiate the 
final reduction in Submarine CCS personnel. 
D. VIRGINIA CLASS SUBMARINE IS OUR COMPARISON BASELINE 
The RTOC analysis recognizes that the physical dimensions of the submarine 
platform are centered on the shipboard complement of crewmembers. The assumption for 
sake of simplicity is that the current Virginia Class submarine is the baseline hull design 
and that any reduction of hull size as a result of manning reduction is left for future 
analysis and is beyond the scope of this project. 
E. CURRENT SENSOR SUITE PERFORMANCE NOT CONSIDERED  
This report assumes that the outboard sensor suite provides the necessary signal to 
noise ratio visual and frequency cues needed to exceed the detection thresholds of the 
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receiving systems.  The variability in the contact detections are representative of gaining 
and losing contacts and are indicative of environmental or kinematic effects of the target. 
Improvements to detection algorithms and sensor display of sensor data are not 
within scope of this project. 
F. CURRENT SENSOR SUITE PERFORMANCE IS ADEQUATE 
The overall system development and implementation of the sensors will provide 
the necessary performance capacity to successfully execute the combat system 
requirements. The system must demonstrate high reliability in order for the operators to 
have trust in the system output. The system reliability is assumed to be accounted for by 
expert hardware and software developers with sufficient experience levels, data 
processing, memory capacity and algorithm confidence. These attributes are necessary 
for a reliable and trustworthy system. 
G. PASSIVE SONAR ONLY 
This project team considers the passive sonar system and omits the active system 
to simplify the overall system requirements and modeling effort. This active sonar aspect 
of the combat system is left for future students to evaluate and assess for Fleet based 
implementation. 
H. WORST CASE CONTACT DENSITY IS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
The contact arrival rate for the transit from the homeport to the combat operating 
area will generate the highest contact loading for the engagement chain. The worst-case 
transit point identified via AIS analysis is the Straits of Gibraltar where the shipping 
density was on the order of 130 non-warship contacts per hour.  Based on the AIS 
contacts shown in the VT Explorer® software, the greatest contact density appeared to be 
in the Mediterranean Sea.  The VT Explorer® software was used to determine the contact 
density of a given timeframe, over the course of a two to four hour period in the Gibraltar 
area.  The identified vessels were binned into the categories of pleasure, merchant and 
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warship.  The resultant data was used as an input into the SCSEP model as a stress case 
for the contact overload condition. 
I. EFFICIENCY IS A BETTER METRIC THAN SIMPLE MANNING 
REQUIREMENTS 
Efficiency is the overarching metric for this project.  It is a function of contact 
processing effectiveness and cost. The effectiveness is defined as the ability of the 
combat system to process and assess the threat versus non-threat contacts vice the 
specifics of the platform performance in a given environment.  With the goal of RTOC, 
the project team members agreed that a meaningful metric of CC efficiency would be 
defined as the effectiveness of the SCSEP compared to the number of people operating 
the equipment. 
J. ONLY DIRECT COST IN MANNING IS CONSIDERED 
The cost model accounts for the direct unit cost elements that are related to each 
platform and does not account for the potential savings in terms of housing, medical, 
sustainment and specialized training that are necessary to support individuals throughout 
their careers. The approach to RTOC estimation for cost savings was to address reduction 
of tangible personnel specific costs and relate that cost to a manning reduction in CCS 
operations. The cost savings from a submarine platform Life Cycle and Submarine Force 
personnel indirect cost perspective was considered a separate topic outside the scope of 
this systems engineering project. The indirect cost could be a makeup of food, clothing, 
health care, entertainment and other necessities.  To meet the timeline and to fit within 
the scope of the project these costs were left to future studies. 
K. COMMAND PERSONNEL WILL MAKE THE CORRECT DECISIONS 
GIVEN THE CORRECT SITUATIONAL PICTURE  
Part of the engagement chain is to “engage” or “act”. What constitutes that action 
depends upon both the current situation and the mission requirements. Since the project 
team cannot know a priori what the mission requirements are, the assumption was made 
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that the submarine command structure has enough experience to make the right action 
decision if provided with the best possible current situational picture. 
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XV APPENDIX C: SIMULATION EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND 
ANALYSIS 
The following sections address the experimental analysis that was conducted 
throughout the project. 
A. SCSEP FIRST MODEL RUN OUTPUT DISTRIBUTION ANALYSIS 
The input parameter set for the DOE were in accordance with the process in 
[Yang 2009]. The DOE functional relationship takes the form: 
 
(8) 
Converting the input factors for the SCSEP project: 
 
(9) 
where x1 - x9 are: 
• Man BBG Process, 
• Man NBG Process, 
• Man Visual Process, 
• Man ES Process, 
• Man Update Tracker Process, 
• Man TMA Process, 
• Men TMA, 
• Men Pool, 
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• Machine Effectiveness. 
The above inputs represent three categories: allocation of the percentage of 
personnel assigned to a particular process, the number of personnel available and the 
effectiveness of the machine system when compared to personnel. 
To initiate the DOE, the inputs to the Input, Process, Output (IPO) diagram in 
Figure 28 was created to illustrate the effects in the model and the output. The input 
ranges for the model are shown in Table 22. 
 
Figure 28 SCSEP IPO Diagram 
1. Custom Factorial Design 
The two level full factorial designs would require factors on the order of 29 
combinations, or a total of 512 combinations. Yang has identified that higher order 
interaction effects can be excluded and reduced to a fractional factorial design [Yang 
2009]. The JMP9® software was used to create a custom DOE model representation of 
the SCSEP project using the Custom DOE worksheet. To create the worksheet the 
software requires inputs (factors) and outputs (responses) to establish the model. By 
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selecting the two level categorical factors, the interactions between the inputs are 
calculated as shown in equation (9) above. 
Input Factor Min Max Units 
Man BBG Process 25 75 (%) 
Man NBG Process 25 75 (%) 
Man Visual Process 25 75 (%) 
Man ES Process 25 75 (%) 
Man Update Tracker Process 25 75 (%) 
Man TMA Process 25 75 (%) 
Men TMA 1 4 People 
Men Pool 3 6 People 
Machine Effectiveness 0.345 2   
Table 22 SCSEP DOE Inputs 
JMP9® was used to design a custom DOE with two power and two interaction 
levels. The minimum and maximum input levels are shown in Table 22. The fractional 
factorial requires the lower order interactions of the inputs defined in Table 22. The 
JMP9® software develops the model parameters by determining the model terms, 
resulting in forty-six (46) model combinations as shown in Table 23. Each combination 
has the minimum and maximum converted into (-1) and (+1) notation to determine the 
interactivity of the factors. 
Combination Factors/Interactions 
1 Man BBG Process   
2 Man NBG Process   
3 Man Visual Process   
4 Man ES Process   
5 Man Update Tracker Process   
6 Man TMA Process   
7 Men TMA   
8 Men Pool   
9 Machine Effectiveness   
12 (Man BBG Process)2   
22 (Man NBG Process)2   
32 (Man Visual Process)2   
42 (Man ES Process)2   
52 (Man Update Tracker Process)2   
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Combination Factors/Interactions 
62 (Man TMA Process)2   
72 (Men TMA)2   
82 (Men Pool)2   
92 (Machine Effectiveness)2   
1 2 Man BBG Process Man NBG Process 
1 3 Man BBG Process Man Visual Process 
1 4 Man BBG Process Man ES Process 
1 5 Man BBG Process Man Update Tracker Process 
1 6 Man BBG Process Man TMA Process 
1 7 Man BBG Process Men TMA 
1 8 Man BBG Process Men Pool 
1 9 Man BBG Process Machine Effectiveness 
2 3 Man NBG Process Man Visual Process 
2 4 Man NBG Process Man ES Process 
2 5 Man NBG Process Man Update Tracker Process 
2 6 Man NBG Process Man TMA Process 
2 7 Man NBG Process Men TMA 
2 8 Man NBG Process Men Pool 
2 9 Man NBG Process Machine Effectiveness 
3 4 Man Visual Process Man ES Process 
3 5 Man Visual Process Man Update Tracker Process 
3 6 Man Visual Process Man TMA Process 
3 7 Man Visual Process Men TMA 
3 8 Man Visual Process Men Pool 
3 9 Man Visual Process Machine Effectiveness 
4 5 Man ES Process Man Update Tracker Process 
4 6 Man ES Process Man TMA Process 
4 7 Man ES Process Men TMA 
4 8 Man ES Process Men Pool 
4 9 Man ES Process Machine Effectiveness 
5 6 Man Update Tracker Process Man TMA Process 
5 7 Man Update Tracker Process Men TMA 
5 8 Man Update Tracker Process Men Pool 
5 9 Man Update Tracker Process Machine Effectiveness 
6 7 Man TMA Process Men TMA 
6 8 Man TMA Process Men Pool 
6 9 Man TMA Process Machine Effectiveness 
7 8 Men TMA Men Pool 
7 9 Men TMA Machine Effectiveness 
8 9 Men Pool Machine Effectiveness 
Table 23 DOE Interaction Factor List 
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Weight 0.3191 0.0383 0.0960 0.5470  Threshold 0.8 0.8 0.7 8 Evaluation Score Goal 0.999 0.95 0.9 3 
Table 24 KPP Assessment 
3. Output Responses Used To Evaluate the Runs 
To calculate the output values, the following four responses were determined by 
the DOE model: 
• Percent maintained contacts (CM) 
• Completeness of Comprehension: Fusion (CCF) 
• Correctness of Comprehension: TMA (CCT) 
















# Men TMA 
      X 
# Men Pool 
      X 
Fusion Score Mean (CCF) 
  X     
BBG Status 1 
X       
BBG Status 2 
X       
NBG Status 1 
X       
NBG Status 2 
X       
NBG Status 3 
X       
Visual Status 2 
X       
Visual Status 3 
X       
Visual Status 4 
X       
Bearing Confidence Mean 

















Range Confidence Mean 
    X   
BBG Excessive Wait 
(stale target) 
X       
NBG Excessive Wait 
(stale target) 
X       
Visual Excessive Wait 
(stale target) 
X       
TMA Utilization mean(%) 
      X 
Pool Utilization mean(%) 
      X 
Table 25 Mapping Model Components to the KPPs Modeled 
The DOE resulted in the Table 26. 
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Score 1 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 4 6 2 0.68361845 2 0.25 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.75 4 6 0.345 0.57197517 3 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1 3 2 0.90252514 4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 3 3 2 0.7422604 5 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 1 6 0.345 0.61825469 6 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 3 3 0.345 0.82667932 7 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.75 1 6 2 0.69662336 8 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.25 1 6 1.1725 0.66736508 9 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 3 3 2 0.90247607 10 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 3 5 0.345 0.59064209 11 0.75 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 3 6 2 0.75329901 12 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.25 1 3 2 0.84486423 13 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.75 1 6 0.345 0.63708733 14 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 3 6 0.345 0.46236265 15 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 6 2 0.49346882 16 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.25 4 3 2 0.85851432 17 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.5 4 3 2 0.75819208 18 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 3 1.1725 0.8076227 19 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 3 6 2 0.7079838 20 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1 6 0.345 0.72924527 21 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.5 4 3 1.1725 0.84760856 22 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 1 6 2 0.59785916 23 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 5 0.345 0.5629718 24 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 1 3 2 0.80890232 25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.5 4 3 0.345 0.80740589 
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Score 26 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 1 3 1.1725 0.80907624 27 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.5 1 6 0.345 0.64193381 28 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 1 3 2 0.90310743 29 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 4 6 2 0.57892349 30 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.25 1 6 0.345 0.53386447 31 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 4 5 0.345 0.63999783 32 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 1 6 2 0.52355981 33 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.75 4 6 0.345 0.44768588 34 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.5 4 3 0.345 0.71852303 35 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 1 3 0.345 0.87152614 36 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 3 0.345 0.84536655 37 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75 4 6 2 0.48522334 38 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 4 6 2 0.76749173 39 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.25 4 3 0.345 0.84023196 40 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.75 1 3 0.345 0.70342472 41 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 4 3 0.345 0.76827823 42 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 4 3 2 0.81179615 43 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 4 3 0.345 0.61722312 44 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 1 3 0.345 0.78397653 45 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 4 3 2 0.8092077 46 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 1 3 2 0.86006426 47 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 1 6 2 0.57391456 48 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.25 4 6 2 0.59651631 49 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.25 4 6 0.345 0.5381402 50 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.5 1 3 0.345 0.78542539 
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Score 51 0.25 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 4 5 2 0.75746317 52 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.75 4 5 2 0.62885725 53 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.5 0.75 3 6 2 0.49936421 54 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 3 6 0.345 0.53913317 55 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 1 5 1.1725 0.76869368 56 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 4 6 1.1725 0.57334446 57 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5 1 3 2 0.87816763 58 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.75 0.25 4 5 0.345 0.63839886 59 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.75 1 3 0.345 0.77131623 60 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.5 4 5 2 0.69745856 61 0.5 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.25 0.5 1 6 2 0.68621551 62 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.75 4 3 0.345 0.69669303 63 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 1 6 0.345 0.46765684 64 0.25 0.25 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.25 4 6 0.345 0.69840393 
Table 26 Input Factors and DOE input value matrix 
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The results for sensitivity to the input factors are shown in Table 26. The analysis 
was performed to find those factors and cross-factors that, at the 95 percent confidence 
interval, are not sensitive. Table 27 shows the sensitivity analysis of only those factors 
that have a probability of less than 0.05.  
Term Probability>|t| 
#Men Pool(3,6) <.0001* 
%Man Tracker(0.25,0.75) <.0001* 
%Man TMA(0.25,0.75) <.0001* 
Machine Effectiveness(0.345,2) <.0001* 
%Man NB(0.25,0.75) <.0001* 
%Man Tracker*#Men Pool <.0001* 
%Man Tracker*%Man Tracker 0.0076* 
%Man TMA*#Men TMA 0.0163* 
%Man NB*Machine Effectiveness 0.0230* 
%Man BB*%Man ES 0.0265* 
%Man NB*#Men Pool 0.0336* 
#Men TMA(1,4) 0.0422* 
%Man Vis*%Man Vis 0.0455* 
Table 27 Input Factors, Second Order and Two Level Cross Terms that demonstrate sensitivity 
The DOE analysis was re-run only for those factors and cross-factors shown in 





























































































































































































































































































Table 29 Reduced Input Factors, Second Order and Two Level Cross Term Sensitivity Analysis 
Using JMP9®’s Desirability Maximizer function, the values shown in Figure 29 
were determined as sensitive to the input factors. 
 

























results 25 25 25 75 25 25 1 3 2 
Table 30 Input Factors from the DOE 
It is noted that percent machine is equal to 1 minus percent man.  Table 30 shows the data 
set that provides the optimum results of the model that produce an average utilization of 










































































XVI APPENDIX D: UNTL TASK BREAKDOWNS 
The UNTL was consulted as verification that the various identified Combat 
Control tasks were incorporated in the concepts and simulations. For the three scenarios, 
the task list was consulted, and provided Table 31 and Table 32.  The L0 functions were 




Table 31 UNTL Breakdown (Part 1) 
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